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Detecting Corporate Environmental 
Cheating 
Seema Kakade and Matt Haber 
As evidenced by the Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal, corporations 
cheat on environmental regulations. Such scandals have created a surge in the 
academic literature in a wide range of areas, including corporate law, 
administrative law, and deterrence theory. This Article furthers that literature 
by focusing on one particular area of corporate cheating—the ability to learn of 
the cheating in the first place. Detecting corporate cheating requires significant 
information about corporate behavior, activity, and output. Indeed, most 
agencies have broad statutory authority to collect such information from 
corporations, through targeted records requests and inspection. However, 
authority is different from ability. The corporate world moves quickly, the 
number of regulated entities are many, and agencies often face legal and 
resource challenges to information collection processes that can impede 
detection of cheating. As a result, this Article advocates for a shift in focus to 
mandatory self-monitoring and reporting mechanisms that place the initial 
burden of detection on the regulated corporate entity instead of the agency. This 
Article uses, as a case study, sulfur dioxide air pollution standards in the 
shipping industry to demonstrate that such a shift can improve the likelihood of 
detecting cheating. International standards for the harmful pollutant sulfur 
dioxide became more stringent in January 2020, and the price difference 
between compliance and noncompliance is high. Therefore, there is a significant 
incentive for shipping companies to cheat. Failure of agencies to catch the 
cheaters not only undermines the anticipated public benefits of the regulations 
but also creates an uneven playing field for those regulated entities that spend 
the money to comply. However, agencies alone simply cannot be expected to 
detect all corporate cheating. They need help from those that have the requisite 
information, specifically the regulated entities themselves. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Corporate compliance scandals are pervasive, especially in recent years.1 
Indeed, Fortune Magazine published articles reporting on the “biggest business 
scandals” of the year in 2015, 2016, and 2017.2 The Volkswagen diesel 
emissions crisis made the top of the list in 2015, but other scandals dominated 
the news cycle as well, including the scandals involving Bank of America’s 
contribution to the housing crisis and Wells Fargo’s credit fraud.3 How did 
agencies, which are supposed to monitor corporate activity, fail to see the 
scandals coming? Ideally, when agencies write regulations, regulated corporate 
entities will comply. After all, such regulations are vitally important to society 
and impact everything from the price of goods and services to public health and 
natural resource protection. It is of little use to have such regulations if the 
 
 1. John Armour et al., Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2020) (describing 
multiple corporate cheating scandals involving Volkswagen, British Petroleum, Duke Energy, and several 
banks). 
 2. Chris Matthews & Stephen Gandel, The 5 Biggest Corporate Scandals of 2015, FORTUNE (Dec. 
27, 2015, 10:47 AM), https://fortune.com/2015/12/27/biggest-corporate-scandals-2015/; Chris Matthews 
& Matthew Heimer, The 5 Biggest Corporate Scandals of 2016, FORTUNE (Dec. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
https://fortune.com/2016/12/28/biggest-corporate-scandals-2016/; Lucinda Shen, The 10 Biggest 
Business Scandals of 2017, FORTUNE (Dec. 31, 2017, 12:16 PM), https://fortune.com/2017/12/31/biggest-
corporate-scandals-misconduct-2017-pr/. 
 3. Paul Blake, Timeline of the Wells Fargo Accounts Scandal, ABC NEWS, (Dec. 28, 2016, 4:15 
PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/timeline-wells-fargo-accounts-scandal/story?id=42231128; Alex 
Pickett, Homeowners Claim Bank of America Schemed to Steal Their Homes, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
SERVICE, (June 29, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/homeowners-claim-bank-america-schemed-
steal-homes/; Suzy Khimm, The Truth Behind the $17 Billion Bank of America Settlement, (Aug. 29, 2014, 
4:27 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-truth-behind-the-17-billion-bank-america-settlement. 
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regulated entities flout them. Not only does corporate noncompliance undermine 
the public benefits that these regulations are designed to achieve, but it also 
offends fundamental notions of fairness in the marketplace for those regulated 
entities that work hard to comply.  
This Article is focused on deliberate noncompliance, or cheating. To be 
sure, understanding what compliance means in the first place can be difficult. 
Regulations are complex. They often include exceptions, alternative forms of 
compliance, and subjective standards. Many regulated entities have elaborate 
internal compliance departments that work hard to understand regulations and 
detect potential noncompliance on their own.4 Such an investment in internal 
corporate compliance comes at the same time that corporations are experiencing 
pressures from shareholders, consumers, and suppliers to not only comply with 
regulations but also weave socially and environmentally responsible decisions 
into every aspect of the entities’ functioning.5 Nevertheless, it is clear that such 
internal corporate compliance and accountability mechanisms are deficient.6 
Pressure on middle management to perform, tight profit margins, and 
competition make cheating an attractive option for corporations.7 In addition, 
where the cost differential between noncompliance and compliance is large, the 
economic incentive to cheat is great. Therefore, while some noncompliance may 
be inadvertent or the result of honest mistakes, there is undoubtedly some level 
of noncompliance that is simply cheating.  
The question then becomes: What should be the role of agencies in the 
detection of corporate cheating? Information is an essential first step in detection. 
Federal statutes attempt to make it easy for agencies to collect information from 
regulated entities through a variety of means. Several statutes provide agencies 
with administrative subpoena and search authority, which courts have interpreted 
broadly.8 Agencies use such authority to request confidential business 
 
 4. See Veronica Root Martinez, Complex Compliance Investigations, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 
255 (2020) (noting that “despite spending a great deal of time, effort, and money to enact structural 
reforms and improvements within organizations’ compliance programs, every year brings a new, more 
stunning example of how organizations’ attempts to reign in misconduct often fail to prevent even the 
most extensive compliance failures within industries and firms.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(May–June 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution (discussing the growing interest of 
investors in corporations’ ESG performance).  
 6. See Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 205 (2019) (noting that 
“[c]ompliance refers to a firm’s effort to ensure that it and its agents adhere to legal and regulatory 
requirements, industry practice, and the firm’s own internal policies and norms. Organizations from all 
over the world, out of fear of sanction, harm, retribution, or ridicule, initiate programs aimed at making 
certain that their employees and members maintain compliance with external and internal norms and 
requirements. Yet every year seems to bring another set of significant scandals within organizations.”). 
 7. Telephone interview with shipping company (notes on file with author). 
 8. Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors  Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 369, 432–33 (2019) (describing the oversight authority of agencies and noting that “Congress has 
typically imposed less procedural oversight of regulatory monitors. A Department of the Interior 
authorizing statute requires formal adjudicative processes including, for example, subpoena power 
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information from regulated entities, gain access to private areas, and collect 
evidence through inspections. Several statutes also provide whistleblower 
protections for individuals with inside access to help agencies detect potential 
cheating.9 Indeed, in the shipping industry, whistleblowers have been the 
primary means of notification to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) when 
crewmembers have illegally attached pipes to ships in order to discharge oil-
contaminated ballast water.10  
However, as this Article discusses, agencies still face numerous challenges 
in information collection. There is only so much agencies can do, given the large 
number of regulated entities that need careful watching. Budgets are tight. 
Agencies also face legal challenges from regulated entities, including pushback 
on the burden and scope of agency information collection authority, which makes 
agencies risk averse about collecting information in the first place. Further, not 
only are some regulated areas highly technical, they are also increasingly 
international in scope, making information collection even more difficult. As a 
result, the seemingly expansive ability for agencies to collect information about 
potential corporate cheating only goes so far in reality.  
This Article argues for increased reliance on the regulated entity to provide 
information to agencies about potential cheating, through self-monitoring and 
reporting. Indeed, the idea of self-monitoring and reporting is not new. Many 
agencies, both in the environmental context and outside the environmental 
context, have had longstanding programs in place for voluntary self-monitoring 
and reporting.11 Such programs incentivize regulated entities to self-monitor and 
report in exchange for potential enforcement discretion or penalty reductions.12 
However, incentives are not enough because they leave gaps in information 
coming to agencies and regulated entities are able to self-select when, how, and 
which violations to monitor and report to agencies.13 It also leaves regulated 
entities in a quandary, having to decide which violations to monitor and report.14 
 
mirroring that in ‘the district courts of the United States’ for offshore oil platform investigations, but not 
for inspections.”) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1348(c)–(d),(f) (2012)). 
 9. See Clean Air Act § 322, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2019); Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2019); Clean Water Act § 507, 33 U.S.C. § 
1367 (2019); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1450, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2019); Toxic Substances Control 
Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2019). 
 10. Press Release, Princess Cruise Lines to Pay Largest-Ever Criminal Penalty for Deliberate 
Vessel Pollution, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/princess-cruise-
lines-pay-largest-ever-criminal-penalty-deliberate-vessel-pollution. 
 11. This is discussed further below in Part II.  
 12. Amanda Raad et al., Self-Reporting to the Authorities and Other Disclosure Obligations  The 
US Perspective, GLOB. INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Jan. 3, 2017), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/
chapter/1079272/self-reporting-to-the-authorities-and-other-disclosure-obligations-the-us-perspective. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Todd Ehret, Self-Reporting Is a Difficult Decision for Some Firms, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-self-reporting-idUSKCN1QL1X0; Richard Reichman, Self-
Reporting of Corporate Wrongdoing Should Be Further Encouraged, EURONEWS (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/26/self-reporting-of-corporate-wrongdoing-should-be-encouraged-
view.  
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Indeed, multiple blog posts by law firms seek to advise regulated entities on 
when and when not to monitor and report violations that are detected by internal 
corporate compliance departments.15 Instead, self-monitoring and reporting 
should be mandatory for regulated entities.  
This Article presents an important opportunity to detect potential corporate 
cheating on new sulfur dioxide (SO2) air pollution standards through enhanced 
use of mandatory monitoring and reporting mechanisms in the shipping industry. 
SO2 air pollution from the combustion of fuel on ships causes significant health 
and natural resource impacts worldwide.16 Indeed, some of the largest cargo 
ships are so huge, and combust so much fuel, that they produce as much air 
pollution as fifty million cars.17 Thus, cheating on SO2 fuel standards by even 
one ship has tremendous consequences for air pollution. Further, the economic 
incentive to cheat is enormous, with one shipping company representative 
commenting that full compliance with the new standards will cost his company 
$300 million.18 An industry alliance of responsible shipping companies has 
demanded increased agency attention to detect potential corporate cheating, in 
particular advocating for increased agency inspection and fuel sampling.19 
Further, the industry alliance has advocated for increased use by agencies of 
remote sensing technologies on drones and satellites that fly over ships and 
 
 15. Shoshana Thoma-Isgur, When and What to Self-Report — And How to Benefit from It, LAW360 
(Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/742885/when-and-what-to-self-report-and-how-to-benefit-
from-it; To Tell or Not to Tell  Best Practices for Managers Considering Whether to Self-Report Legal or 
Regulatory Violations, HEDGE FUND LEGAL & COMPLIANCE DIG. (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.
bakerbotts.com/~/media/images/news/2016/to-tell-or-not-to-tell-best-practices-fo.pdf; Junaid A. Zubairi 
& Brooke E. Conner, Is SEC Cooperation Credit Worthwhile?, LAW360 (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.
law360.com/articles/833392/is-sec-cooperation-credit-worthwhile-; Deborah Carpentier, Self-Reporting 
Routine Compliance Violations, CROWELL & MORING LLP (July 2014), www.crowell.com/files/NERC-
Enforcement-Issues-Self-Reporting-Routine-Compliance-Violations.pdf; Olga Greenberg et al., 
Considerations before Self-Reporting under New FCPA Policy, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2017), us.eversheds-
sutherland.com/portalresource/Considerations-Before-Self-Reporting-Under-New-FCPA-Policy.pdf; 
Ruth Cowley et al., Self-Reporting Bribery  The Ongoing Dilemma, PLC MAG., (July 26, 2018).  
 16. Shipping’s Impact on Air Quality, TRANSP. & ENV’T, https://www.transportenvironment.org/
what-we-do/shipping-and-environment/shipping’s-impact-air-quality#:~:text=Through%20chemical%
20reactions%20in%20the%20air%2C%20SO2%20and,Tiny%20airborne%20particles%20are%20linked
%20to%20premature%20deaths. 
 17. Paul Evans, Big Polluters  One Massive Container Ship Equals 50 Million Cars, NEW ATLAS 
(Apr. 23, 2009), https://newatlas.com/shipping-pollution/11526/; see also Fred Pearce, How 16 Ships 
Create as Much Pollution as All the Cars in the World, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 21, 2009), https://www.
dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1229857/How-16-ships-create-pollution-cars-world.html (citing to 
studies by University of Delaware Professor James Corbett and specifically noting “the largest ships can 
emit as much as 5,000 tons of sulphur in a year—the same as 50 million typical cars, each emitting an 
average of 100 grams of sulphur per year.”).  
 18. Telephone interview with shipping company (notes on file with author).  
 19. Who We Are, TRIDENT ALLIANCE, http://www.tridentalliance.org/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 
30, 2020); see also Ship & Bunker News Team, New Shipping Initiative to Work for Strong ECA 
Enforcement, SHIP & BUNKER (last visited Nov. 19, 2020), https://shipandbunker.com/news/world/
693043-new-shipping-initiative-to-work-for-strong-eca-enforcement.  
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estimate the amount of sulfur dioxide in the exhaust.20 However, as this Article 
describes, such agency tools are hugely expensive and time consuming, and they 
raise legal questions as to when agencies are authorized to conduct advanced 
inspections.  
Thus, responsible companies in the shipping industry need to consider their 
own role in helping to detect cheating. If all ships were required to directly 
measure and report their own sulfur dioxide emissions to relevant port agencies, 
detection of cheating would undoubtedly increase. However, even responsible 
companies are not yet embracing this approach.21 After all, why would regulated 
entities agree to direct monitoring and reporting requirements? Discussions with 
individuals in the shipping industry and a review of shipping industry 
publications make clear that there are now direct monitoring capabilities that are 
technically feasible and cost-effective. Further, as described in this Article, direct 
monitoring and reporting allows shipping companies to conclusively state that 
they are “compliant” with all relevant laws, as is frequently required by vendor 
contracts and other similar private agreements. On a broader level, direct 
monitoring and reporting ensure that if companies spend the money to comply, 
they will not be undercut by companies engaging in undetected cheating.  
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I frames the issues surrounding 
corporate cheating, focusing on why corporate environmental cheating remains 
a problem despite the trend toward greater corporate social and environmental 
responsibility. Part II describes the legal, policy, and resource difficulties 
associated with agency information collection and detection of corporate 
cheating. While Part II focuses on information collection by environmental 
agencies, it draws upon the experiences of enforcement agencies that work to 
detect corporate cheating in other areas as well, such as financial fraud, energy 
market manipulation, and food safety violations. Part III argues that regulated 
entities should help agencies collect information needed to increase detection of 
cheaters because while increased detection benefits the public, it also benefits 
regulated entities in unexpected and underappreciated ways. In particular, Part 
III focuses on self-monitoring and reporting. Part IV provides a detailed case 
study of the shipping industry and advocates for mandatory self-monitoring and 
reporting coupled with the use of direct emissions monitoring and reporting. The 
Article ends with concluding thoughts about other areas of detection of corporate 
environmental cheating that could benefit from self-monitoring and reporting by 
regulated entities.  
 
 20. Drones Lead the Way in Emissions Compliance, RIVIERA, https://www.rivieramm.com/opinion/
drones-lead-the-way-in-emissions-compliance-35819 (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
 21. Emissions Monitoring  Maintaining a Level Playing Field Post-2020, RIVIERA, https://
www.rivieramm.com/opinion/opinion/emissions-monitoring-maintaining-a-level-playing-field-post-
2020-23341 (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (“The mandatory installation of CEMS was actually proposed by 
IMO, but to no avail. And while some owners have mooted the notion of voluntary CEMS installation and 
reporting to their customers, interest from the shippers community in general has been minimal.”).   
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I.  FRAMING THE ISSUE 
There is an interesting dichotomy at play in the corporate world: 
Corporations are violating the nation’s federal environmental laws at the same 
time that they are investing heavily in internal corporate compliance and 
social/environmental responsibility programs. This Part sets forth the 
background for understanding this dichotomy and the role of enforcement 
agencies in enforcing environmental regulations.  
A. Corporate Cheating 
The government regulates corporate behavior and activity with the goal of 
public protection. Environmental regulations alone bring benefits to the public 
in a wide range of areas, including natural resource quality, visibility, ecosystem 
health, safety, and human health benefits such as avoidance of premature 
mortality.22 For example, the regulatory impact assessment for EPA’s mercury 
air toxics rule, applicable to the utility industry, anticipated hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in benefits from reduced hospital visits.23 However, such 
regulations rarely take into account any anticipated noncompliance or cheating 
by regulated entities. As the former head of EPA’s Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance under the Obama administration recently wrote, “most 
environmental policy practitioners, including government regulators, regulated 
companies, legislators, academics, and advocates—assume[] compliance.”24 
Noncompliance or cheating ultimately impacts the underlying benefits of the 
regulation. The Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal exemplifies the harm of 
failing to detect corporate cheating. In the case of Volkswagen, actual emissions 
of harmful nitrogen oxides from violating cars were ten to forty times higher than 
the standards allowed.25 Thus, every day the violating cars stayed on the road, 
they created significantly higher levels of air pollution than what the standards 
established as necessary to protect public health.  
However, there is very little information about how often, how much, and 
in what context regulated entities violate regulations. To be sure, there are 
different kinds of violations. Some violations are simply mistakes; corporate 
entities may be unaware of what it takes to comply with the regulations.26 Some 
 
 22. See, e.g., EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS 
STANDARDS ES-3 (2011) (discussing multiple benefits from regulation).   
 23. Id. 
 24. Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance  Environmental Regulation for the Modern Era, 
HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020), http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/
Cynthia-Giles-Intro-FINAL.pdf (emphasis added). 
 25. Noelle Eckley Selin, The Not-So-Invisible Damage from VW Diesel Cheat  $100 Million in 
Health Costs, CONVERSATION BLOG (Sept. 29, 2015, 4:44 PM), https://theconversation.com/the-not-so-
invisible-damage-from-vw-diesel-cheat-100-million-in-health-costs-48296. 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Economy Muffler & Tire Ctr., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (E.D. 
Va. 1991) (noting that “Economy Muffler also claims that its employees did not knowingly violate the 
Clean Air Act because they were not aware of the Act’s requirements with respect to converters”). 
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are inadvertent; corporate entities tried to comply, but something went wrong in 
the process.27 Some are debatable; it is likely that an action by a corporate entity 
constitutes a violation, but it may also fall within an exception.28 However, some 
violations, like the ones present in Volkswagen case, are clear; the corporate 
entity deliberately cheated because there was a benefit to doing so. Indeed, the 
lack of information about violations, including how much is inadvertent, 
debatable, or outright cheating, is part of the problem that this Article seeks, in 
part, to address.  
Moreover, measuring corporate cheating is difficult because regulations are 
rarely straightforward. To be sure, sometimes regulations do set specific 
thresholds that are easy to follow, such as a maximum and minimum speed limit 
on a highway. However, even for such quantitative standards, there may be 
exceptions or alternative methods of compliance.29 Other standards are 
qualitative, measured by whether a regulated corporate entity engaged in a 
particular behavior or with a specific intent.30 Other standards simply impose 
administrative obligations on regulated entities, such as requirements to send 
reports or keep records for a certain period of time.31 Therefore, understanding 
whether a corporate regulated entity is compliant or not is not always as 
straightforward as might be expected. 
Large corporate scandals of the last several years demonstrate that 
sophisticated companies are engaging in corporate cheating.32 In the 
environmental context, the Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal of 2015 
stunned the environmental and legal community.33 While this Article is focused 
 
 27. Pub. Interest Rsch. Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules Inc., 2003 WL 23519620, at *33 (D.N.J. Oct. 
27, 2003) (“The 23 violations were inadvertent mistakes that were not part of any intentional plan to 
mislead or get away with a lesser environmental standard and they were not the basis of an ongoing pattern 
of indifference or misrepresentation, given the many thousands of opportunities for such errors in 
paperwork over those years.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Allison Holden, When It Comes to the Clean Air Act’s Routine Maintenance, Repair, 
and Replacement Exception, Everyone’s a Loser, GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. (Oct. 25, 2012), 
https://gwjeel.com/2012/10/25/when-it-comes-to-the-clean-air-acts-routine-maintenance-repair-and-
replacement-exception-everyones-a-loser/ (describing the lengthy litigation over the applicability of an 
exception under the CAA’s New Source Review program).  
 29. For example, traffic laws may allow speeding exceptions for certain vehicles in specific 
situations, such as for health emergencies or inclement weather. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.365 (2019) 
(creating a speed limit exception for emergencies); Speed Limits, VA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
http://www.virginiadot.org/info/faq-speedlimits.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (stating that speed limits 
are for typical road conditions and motorists should adjust in non-typical conditions).   
 30. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7522 (2018) (prohibiting manufacturers of cars from distributing, selling, 
offering for sale, delivering, and importing any new car that does not have a certificate of conformity). 
 31. See id. (prohibiting any person from failing tests or refusing to perform tests or have tests 
performed). 
 32. Matthews & Gandel, supra note 2; Matthews & Heimer, supra note 2; Shen, supra note 2. 
 33. J.S. Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1496 (2019) (noting that 
the Volkswagen scandal, involving emissions cheating, is representative of “modern large-scale corporate 
wrongdoing”); Kelly Kollman & Alvise Favotto, How VW Took the Corporate Ethics Industry to the 
Brink, CONVERSATION BLOG (Nov. 2, 2015, 4:54 AM), http://theconversation.com/how-vw-took-the-
corporate-ethics-industry-to-the-brink-49351. 
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on corporate cheating on environmental laws, corporate cheating in other policy 
areas has certainly been at the forefront of scandal as well. Multiple large 
companies, such as Valeant, Equifax, and Wells Fargo, have committed legal 
violations in a variety of market abuse areas, including racketeering, fraud, 
consumer protection, and price gouging.34 These large corporate scandals, when 
they occur, dominate the news. 
However, not all instances of corporate cheating even make the news. 
Everyday corporate cheating is more difficult to quantify and understand.35 
Several environmental enforcement offices report significant noncompliance by 
regulated entities. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) reports that in 2018, over 29 percent of facilities that had National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) were in significant noncompliance with their permits.36 The violations 
ranged from failure to submit reports to significant exceedances of effluent 
limits. The permittees that had high effluent violations discharged almost four 
billion pounds of pollutants above their permitted limits.37 While in some cases, 
cheating may not be deliberate, it is hard to imagine that all such instances are 
merely inadvertent mistakes.38 The reason for such everyday noncompliance 
may be that nobody is watching.  
Moreover, statistics that do cite to violation rates can sometimes use faulty 
assumptions or misinformation. For example, EPA’s Enforcement Compliance 
History Online database is supposed to provide information about environmental 
violation rates.39 Yet, even though the Enforcement Compliance History Online 
database is useful for gaining general knowledge about violations, it has 
problems. For instance, the database only lists noncompliance for facilities every 
quarter, and even then, it often has incomplete information, meaning that there 
are potentially even more violations out there going unreported.40 Similar data 
 
 34. Matthews & Gandel, supra note 2. 
 35. Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, The Comparative Effectiveness of Government 
Interventions on Environmental Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 317, 320 
(2007) (“[R]elatively little is known about why regulated entities either do or do not comply with their 
regulatory obligations.”). 
 36. Memorandum from Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator, Off. of Enf’t & Compliance 
Assurance, EPA, to Regional Administrators (June 7, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2019-06/documents/2020-2023ncimemo.pdf. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the 
defendants’ choice to dump “thousands of gallons of toxic sludge into the ocean . . . so as to avoid a 
complete plant shutdown”).   
 39. EPA Enforcement and Compliance History Online, EPA, https://echo.epa.gov/ (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2020) (“Use EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online website to search for facilities 
in your community to assess their compliance with environmental regulations.”).  
 40. Carole Gibbs & Sally S. Simpson, Measuring Corporate Environmental Crime Rates  Progress 
and Problems, 51 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 87, 95 (2009).  
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gaps have been found in analysis of violation rates of the Safe Drinking Water 
Act.41 
Corporate cheating becomes an even bigger problem to estimate when 
looking at companies with an international presence. We live in a global 
marketplace with goods and services routinely moving across borders. Thus, 
corporate cheating in one location can affect consumers, public health, and 
natural resources in another location. In addition, many countries have similar 
laws designed to protect the public from harm by corporations. As a result, 
corporate cheating in one country might mean that the corporation is engaging 
in cheating elsewhere as well. 42 As one scholar notes, “It should command our 
attention that these scandals are enormous in size, occur within diverse 
industries, and increasingly pull across companies and borders.”43  
B. Corporate Accountability 
At the same time large-scale corporate cheating is happening, corporate 
entities are spending significant resources implementing internal corporate social 
and environmental accountability strategies.44 This dichotomy has generated a 
significant amount of legal scholarship.45 Some of the pressure to “go green” 
comes from corporate stakeholders, who are demanding that corporate boards 
demonstrate social and environmental values in corporate decision making.46 
Further, the pressure comes from employees, customers, and suppliers that are 
demanding that companies recognize a broader scope of responsibility in 
addressing political, environmental, and social issues.47  
 
 41. KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK ET AL., NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WATERED DOWN JUSTICE 9 (2019), 
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/watered-down-justice-report.pdf. 
 42. Camilla Hodgson, A History of Human Greed ’ The 26 Different Ways People Have Cheated 
Markets over 200 Years, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 22, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/market-misconduct-report-the-26-ways-people-have-cheated-markets-over-200-years-2017-9 
(showing world map of where illegal market conduct has been detected). 
 43. Nelson, supra note 33, at 1499. 
 44. Alison Smith, Fortune 500 Companies Spend More Than $15bn on Corporate Responsibility, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/95239a6e-4fe0-11e4-a0a4-00144feab7de.  
 45. See Root, supra note 6, at 205; Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate 
Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2013). 
 46. Bill Libit, The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 28, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12
/28/the-corporate-social-responsibility-report-and-effective-stakeholder-engagement/; R. Edward 
Freeman & Heather Elms, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Create Value for Stakeholders, MIT 
SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-social-responsibility-of-
business-is-to-create-value-for-stakeholders/.  
 47. Libit, supra note 46; see also Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest 
in Sustainability  The Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 625, 
631–32 (2019).  
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Private contracts also reinforce pressure to address corporate social and 
environmental responsibility.48 Corporations increasingly have vendor codes of 
conduct that specify certain expectations that the corporations have of their 
partners, suppliers, or other groups that the corporations conduct business with.49 
Vendor codes of conduct set expectations that vendors will minimize their 
impacts to the environment and comply with all environmental regulations.50 For 
example, a search of the word “comply” in the Volkswagen code of conduct 
shows that the word comes up fifteen times, setting an expectation that vendors 
will comply in multiple areas including human rights, taxes and customs, free 
and fair competition, worker safety, and environmental protection.51 Corporate 
codes of conduct also are meant to send signals to employees about corporate 
management commitments and priorities.52 Indeed, employees are essential to 
enforce internal corporate compliance programs and to deter violations within 
the corporation before they happen.53  
However, corporate accountability and compliance may not deserve the 
accolades that they sometimes get in the literature. While a corporation could, in 
theory, end a contract with a vendor if there was evidence of noncompliance, 
there is no evidence this happens in practice. In addition, there is no actual 
requirement that corporate entities engage in comprehensive internal compliance 
programs or strict vendor relationships, and so while there may be a trend 
towards such corporate activities, they do not exist everywhere.54 Moreover, 
internal corporate compliance structures are not enough to ensure corporate 
compliance. 55 Corporate leaders themselves point to the lack of oversight within 
corporate compliance departments.56 For example, former Deutsche Bank 
 
 48. Vandenbergh, supra note 45; David E. Adelman & Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and Private 
Environmental Governance, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 709, 709 (2017) (“Private environmental 
governance is premised on consumers ‘voting with their wallets’ by selecting products that reflect not just 
their instrumental preferences, but also their values.”); Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators  Green 
Bonds and the Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 
(2018); Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 107, 
126 (2015).  
 49. Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1006 (2017).  
 50. See, e.g., S&P GLOBAL, VENDOR CODE OF CONDUCT 6 (2017), https://www.spglobal.com/
en/who-we-are/corporate-responsibility/spglobalvendorcodeofconduct.pdf. 
 51. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP, CODE OF CONDUCT (2020), https://www.volkswagenag.com/presence/
konzern/documents/coc_vw_konzern_en_2020_05_13.pdf.  
 52. Todd Haugh, The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 GA. L. REV. 129, 139 (2018). 
 53. Susan Diehl & Monica Batsford, Auto Industry Compliance  Will the Tone at the Top Go Tone 
Deaf in the Wake of Deregulation?, 2 WAYNE ST. U.J. BUS. L. 1, 6–7 (2019) (noting that “[a] survey of 
over 800 compliance professionals found that a majority of those professionals expect that their 
compliance budgets will increase over the coming year.”). 
 54. Root, supra note 49, at 1010. 
 55. See White-Collar Crime, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/07/white-
collar-crime.  
 56. See, e.g., Todd Haugh, The Trouble with Corporate Compliance Programs, MIT SLOAN MGMT. 
REV. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-trouble-with-corporate-compliance-
programs/; see also Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Failure of Corporate Governance Standards and Antitrust 
Compliance, 58 S.D. L. REV. 499, 500 (2013) (describing lack of ability to deter antitrust law violations: 
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employees have said that the bank has a lax approach to money laundering laws 
and a pattern of protecting relationships with lucrative clients, even if the clients’ 
actions are potential violations.57 In a securities case involving KPMG, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found that auditors, including some 
senior partners, cheated on internal tests related to compliance training, sharing 
answers with other partners and staff to help them attain passing scores.58 In 
addition, legal counsel for corporations have discovered environmental 
violations, only to find out that the internal corporate “plan” to fix the problems 
would never come to fruition.59  
A huge problem within corporate structures is simply that employees feel 
pressure to cheat. Top management can place significant pressure on middle 
management to deliver results, regardless of potential violations along the way.60 
As described by one journalist reporting on the Volkswagen scandal, “Poor, 
unaccountable corporate governance—and short-termist incentives for 
executives—are sadly pervasive.”61 In addition, a Harvard study on Wells Fargo 
found that the bank’s practice of setting daily sales targets put excessive pressure 
on employees to commit fraud.62 Wells Fargo assigned branch managers quotas 
for the number and types of products sold, and if a branch did not hit its targets, 
the shortfall was added to the next day’s goals.63 Studies on internal corporate 
culture point to pervasive problems that lead to large-scale violations, such as 
failure to set a positive example or promote an environment where it is safe to 
speak up about unethical or illegal behavior.64  
In many industries, it does not make financial sense for corporations to 
invest in compliance. Environmental consulting companies say that they get 
 
In part because shareholders have no control over the conduct of personnel, large antitrust fines barely 
affect the individual shareholders of public companies. As a result, antitrust violations continue to occur 
with disappointing frequency). 
 57. David Enrich, Deutsche Bank Staff Saw Suspicious Activity in Trump and Kushner Accounts, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/business/deutsche-bank-trump-
kushner.html. 
 58. Francine McKenna, The KPMG Cheating Scandal Was Much More Widespread than Originally 
Thought, MARKETWATCH (June 18, 2019, 5:03 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-kpmg-
cheating-scandal-was-much-more-widespread-than-originally-thought-2019-06-18.  
 59. Jim Nortz, Some Reflections on Cheating in Business, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (June 11, 
2015), https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/reflections-cheating-business/.  
 60. Nelson, supra note 33, at 1492–93; Armour et al., supra note 1, at 12. 
 61. Robert Armstrong, The Volkswagen Scandal Shows that Corporate Culture Matters, FIN. TIMES 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/263c811c-d8e4-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e. 
 62. Brian Tayan, The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/the-wells-fargo-cross-selling-
scandal-2/; Elizabeth C. Tippett, How Wells Fargo Encouraged Employees to Commit Fraud, 
CONVERSATION BLOG (Oct. 6, 2019, 9:13 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-wells-fargo-
encouraged-employees-to-commit-fraud-66615. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Ron Carucci, Why Ethical People Make Unethical Choices, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/12/why-ethical-people-make-unethical-choices; Armstrong, supra note 61. 
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questions from compliance officers as to whether compliance is worth the cost.65 
Complying with environmental regulations, for example, often requires 
corporations to purchase costly pollution control equipment. Such equipment can 
cost corporations millions of dollars to install and operate.66 Corporations 
perform cost-benefit analyses, knowing that government pursuit of enforcement 
cases can take a long time to reach a conclusion and that enforcement cases are 
often not pursued at all.67 Thus, if a corporate entity is able to fly under the 
regulatory radar, it is hard to justify the need to spend money on compliance. 
There is simply no return on investment.68  
C. Role of Agencies 
The question then becomes: How do agencies formulate enforcement 
programs in a world in which there is undoubtedly significant interest by 
corporations to be “compliant,” while there are also financial reasons to be 
“noncompliant?” Corporations are inherently profit maximizing and, as such, 
will comply with regulations when it makes financial sense to do so.69 Indeed, 
law firm blogs and third-party auditors focus on statutory maximum penalties in 
attempts to convince regulated corporate entities that it is worth the expense to 
invest in compliance.70 Thus, the cost of noncompliance or cheating matters. As 
the late economist Gary Becker and several other scholars since have described, 
the cost of noncompliance is typically a function of both the likelihood of 
apprehension and the sanction imposed.71 However, most of the literature on 
 
 65. Timothy Cory & Michael R. Green, The Cost of Environmental Non-Compliance, ENV’T 
STANDARDS, https://www.envstd.com/the-cost-of-environmental-non-compliance/ (last visited Oct. 1, 
2020). 
 66. Nortz, supra note 59 (“For the following 10 years, until the plant was closed, no money was 
ever allocated for this project. As a consequence, the corporation had cheated and won. It enjoyed the time 
value of $5 million for the decades the plant was in operation and paid no penalty. In so doing, they 
enjoyed an advantage over those competitors who chose to make expenditures necessary to comply with 
the law.”). 
 67. Nelson, supra note 33, at 1520–21. 
 68. Dennis Ruhlin, Average Cost of Environmental Fines, Violations, and Settlements at Industrial 
Facilities, RES. MGMT. ASSOCS., https://www.rmagreen.com/rma-blog/average-cost-of-environmental-
fines-violations-and-settlements (last visited Oct. 1, 2020) (observing that “many businesses out there 
don’t see the ‘value’ in environmental compliance, because unlike other areas of their businesses, it’s 
normally not a money driver. If there’s no ROI [return on investment], what’s the point? This is especially 
true for people who have flown under the regulatory radar so to speak, making it extra difficult to highlight 
the need to spend money on getting into environmental compliance when they never spent a dime in the 
past.”). 
 69. See Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of Environmental Law, 15 DUKE 
ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 1, 39 (2004) (describing generally the Gary Becker deterrence model); Baer, supra 
note 45, at 1301–02.  
 70. The EPA’s Next Regulatory Frontier  Large Ship Emissions, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Apr. 21, 
2014), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/article/2014/04/the-epas-next-regulatory-frontier-large-
ship-emiss (noting that “[f]or civil violations, companies may be liable for a penalty of up to $25,000 for 
each violation”). 
 71. Babbitt et al., supra note 69, at 39. 
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corporate compliance and cheating has focused on sanctions, or penalties.72 
Certainly, these scholars argue, if penalties were just higher, there would be less 
corporate noncompliance and cheating.73 However, a focus on penalties alone 
misses an equally important factor considered by corporations: the likelihood of 
apprehension.74 
The literature on compliance and cheating, especially in the environmental 
context, has focused on the ability of nonagency players, including the public 
and corporate shareholders, to access information about corporate behavior. This 
literature tends to focus not on increasing the likelihood of apprehension for 
regulatory violations but instead on encouraging corporations to be more 
environmentally and socially responsible in a more general sense.75 This 
literature posits that there may be other ways for such benefits to come to fruition, 
including corporate environmental and social responsibility efforts and public 
shaming.76 But regulatory cheating impacts more than society’s ability to 
achieve the anticipated public benefit of the regulation.  
Environmental scholars seem to have given up on agency enforcement, 
turning instead to recommendations that agency officials work collaboratively 
with corporations or alternatively rely on citizen suit enforcement.77 Further, 
political administrations tend to go back and forth over the appropriate role of 
agency enforcement. Indeed, we have seen the pendulum swing between federal 
administrations as they variably focus on strong enforcement efforts versus 
attempting to coax corporations into compliance.78 Professor Bill Andreen notes 
 
 72. Sally S. Simpson et al., An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control 
Strategies, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 233 (arguing that “[i]f the benefits of crime are high and 
the risk of discovery and punishment is low, then criminal opportunities increase as actors perceive less 
risk associated with illegal activities”). 
 73. See, e.g., Mark Atlas, Enforcement Principles and Environmental Agencies  Principal-Agent 
Relationships in a Delegated Environmental Program, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 939, 950 (2007) (“Penalties 
are particularly useful in evaluating the consistency and stringency of enforcement efforts.”). 
 74. Armour et al., supra note 1, at 12 (“This virtuous circle of compliance presupposes that a 
violation triggers enforcement. In practice, the complexity of corporate affairs and the finite resources of 
enforcement agencies mean that the probability of enforcement may only be small.”). 
 75. Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 166 
(2019). Professor Sarah Light provides an excellent example of how ExxonMobil’s 10-K filing prompted 
SEC to investigate a potential violation of the self-disclosure requirements. See id. ExxonMobil had failed 
to adequately inform SEC of information about its oil reserves. Id. at 167–68. The investigation deterred 
ExxonMobil from failing to disclose next time. Id. at 168. The investigation also prompted ExxonMobil 
to make different choices about its oil reserves, one of the underlying purposes of disclosure requirements 
about climate risks to begin with. Id. at 167–68. 
 76. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation  Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691, 696 (2003). 
 77. Adam Babich, Legal Impacts of Increased Public Availability of Air Quality Data, NO. 1 
RMMLF-INST 2, ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 2-1 (2018); Randy Dann et al., Contemporary Issues in 
Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Laws, NO. 6 RMMLF-INST 12 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 12-1 
(2018). 
 78. See Adam Babich, Back to the Basics of Antipollution Law, 32 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 1, 26–27 (2018); 
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental 
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1205–12 (1998). 
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that Democratic administrations have generally pushed for strong deterrence 
models of environmental enforcement, and Republican administrations have 
generally advocated for cooperative models of environmental enforcement.79 For 
example, one of the first changes that the Trump administration made to EPA’s 
enforcement program was to change the national “enforcement” initiatives to 
national “compliance” initiatives.80 Such a change in language may seem benign, 
but it signals a different approach. This change may alter expectations of 
regulated entities and impact the ability of agencies to push for information 
collection. Regulated agencies might view inspection requests as excessively 
burdensome, and there could be budget cuts in agency enforcement. Given the 
lack of dependency with agency enforcement, citizen enforcement might 
represent a more stable approach. Still, this literature misses the important role 
that information access plays in compelling regulatory compliance and the 
impact of cheating on fairness in the marketplace, another core societal value. It 
offends fundamental notions of the rule of law to let cheaters gain a competitive 
advantage by avoiding the cost of compliance. Cheating undermines not only the 
goals of regulation but also the ability of corporate entities to operate on a level 
playing field.  
We must recognize that agencies face formidable barriers to enforcement. 
Agency enforcement cases often face uphill battles on key elements of proof such 
as causation or intent.81 Sometimes, agencies must demonstrate that a regulatory 
exception does not apply.82 Agency enforcement cases also are influenced by 
shifting political goals. Indeed, when the Office of Management and Budget held 
a request for comment period in January 2020, it suggested that the Trump 
administration could choose to require agencies to “show cause” to investigate 
or manage an initial presumption of “innocence” by corporate entities in 
proceedings.83 While it remains unclear as to how the Office of Management and 
Budget request for comment will turn out, it exemplifies the kind of legal 
challenges imposed on agency enforcement offices.  
However, information flowing to agency enforcement offices remains 
vitally important for detection of cheating. Without information, agency 
enforcers have little way to know where to target inspection resources or 
 
 79. See William Andreen, Motivating Enforcement  Institutional Culture and the Clean Water Act, 
24 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 67, 69 n.13 (2007); Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the 
Administrative State, 32 TULSA L.J. 325, 325–26 (1996) (explaining that the Republican-controlled 
Congress sought to shift from an enforcement paradigm for regulation to a cooperative partnership with 
the regulated community in the mid-1990s). 
 80. Mike Soraghan, Trump’s EPA Turns to Less Punitive Responses to Pollution, E&E NEWS (June 
11, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060084031. 
 81. Robert Glicksman et al., Technological Innovation, Data Analytics, and Environmental 
Enforcement, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 41, 61 (2017) (recognizing difficulties in making causal connections). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. La. Generating, LLC, 2012 WL 4107129 (M.D. La. Sept. 19, 2012) 
(granting plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion that the routine maintenance exception did not apply). 
 83. Improving and Reforming Regulatory Enforcement and Adjudication, 85 Fed. Reg. 5483 (Jan. 
30, 2020).  
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otherwise begin to develop elements of proof for an enforcement case. Without 
information, agency enforcers do not know whether a particular violation is an 
indication that the violator is outright cheating or even a repeat offender. Without 
information, agency enforcers do not know the extent of the harm to the public 
from a violation—whether it is large or small—or located in a particularly 
sensitive area. In short, an increase in quality information to agencies is 
necessary for the agencies to be able to effectively do their jobs.  
II.  AGENCY INFORMATION COLLECTION 
This Article focuses on strengthening enforcement by allowing enforcement 
agencies to access information that will increase the likelihood of apprehension. 
This Part sets forth the foundation for understanding the key role that information 
plays in detecting corporate cheating and the challenges that agencies face in 
getting such information. Its purpose is to demonstrate that much of the 
information that enforcement agencies receive about potential corporate cheating 
is ad hoc in nature, coming from multiple and varied sources.  
A. Information Sources 
In order to detect potential cheating, agencies must have information about 
what is happening inside a corporation.84 Congress, in recognizing this need, has 
provided agencies with statutory authority to collect such information.85 Agency 
information collection comes in multiple forms, including the ability to request 
information from specific regulated entities or conduct audits and physical 
inspections.86 As described by Professor Rory Van Loo, “Overall, among the 
nineteen large federal regulators . . . [s]ixteen of the nineteen largest agencies 
have both strong visitorial monitoring and record-collection authority.”87 The 
Clean Air Act (CAA), for example, authorizes EPA to request any information 
it “may reasonably require” to enforce emissions standards.88 EPA may use its 
authority under the CAA to require a corporate entity to submit records, install 
and use monitoring equipment, and sample emissions.89 The CAA also allows 
EPA “the right of entry to, upon or through any premises” where records are 
required to be maintained and “may at reasonable times have access to and copy 
any records, inspect any monitoring equipment . . . and sample any emissions.”90 
 
 84. This Article focuses on agency information collection of business records that do not contain 
personal or individual information.  
 85. Van Loo, supra note 8, at 382–83 (describing numerous statutes that allow agencies to obtain 
nonpublic information from businesses, including agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration, 
the Federal Communications Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, amongst others). 
 86. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (2019). 
 87. Van Loo, supra note 8, at 395–96. 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. § 7414(a)(2).  
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Most other federal environmental statues contain similar records collection and 
inspection authority.91  
Agencies collect information from regulated entities for purposes beyond 
detecting regulatory violations. In particular, agencies collect information from 
regulated entities in order to inform decisions about new programs or 
rulemakings.92 For example, EPA collects information about air emissions from 
regulated entities with the specific goal of updating regional emissions 
inventories for specific pollutants.93 Such information is used to inform decisions 
about which sources contribute to unhealthy air quality and, therefore, should be 
considered for further emissions reductions in permitting.94 In addition, agencies 
might collect information from regulated entities simply to understand a complex 
technical issue. For example, in December 2019, the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration issued an information collection request to motor carriers 
with the stated purpose of allowing the agency to study and assess the 
effectiveness of various technologies, programs, and policies on motor safety 
performance.95  
Agencies seek a wide range of information in order to be able to detect 
potential noncompliance or cheating. Information sought may be quantitative, 
such as prices, or narrative, such as formulas, names, dates, or phrases.96 To 
determine whether markets are being manipulated, agencies may need 
information concerning market transactions, including the profitability of, and 
reasons for, specific transactions.97 Agencies may also seek information 
 
 91. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (2019); 7 U.S.C. § 136g(a) (2019); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a) (2019); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6927(a), 9604(e)(3) (2019). 
 92. CAA sections 114 and 208, CWA section 308, and section 104 of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act all allow EPA to collect information to 
determine compliance and also for the development or modification of regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 1313; 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7414, 7542, 9604. 
 93. 33 U.S.C. § 1313; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414, 7542, 9604. 
 94. Air Emissions Reporting Requirements (AERR), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-
inventories/air-emissions-reporting-requirements-aerr (last visited Oct. 1, 2020) (describing state and 
local agency obligations to collect and submit air emissions information for the purpose of developing the 
National Emission Inventory); Air Emissions Reporting Requirements (AERR) + State & Local Emissions 
Inventory System (SLEIS), STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://health.hawaii.gov/cab/air-
emissions-reporting-requirements-aerr-and-state-local-emissions-inventory-system-sleis/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2020) (describing state reporting requirements for regulated facilities in order for state to fulfill 
reporting goals for the National Emissions Inventory). 
 95. Agency Information Collection Activities; New Information Collection: Beyond Compliance, 
84 Fed. Reg. 69451 (Dec. 18, 2019).  
 96. See, e.g., EPA, REQUEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-03/documents/shb-114-request-201503.pdf (describing 
various items the regulated entity must submit to EPA, including proposed monitoring locations, a map 
of the facility, and daily logs of the monitors).   
 97. Mark J. Niefer, Information and Competition in Electric Power Markets  Is Transparency the 
Holy Grail?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 375, 394 (2014). FERC, in its data requests for detection of corporate 
cheating, for example, asks for financial and operational information, procedures manuals, organization 
charts, reports, and email and voice mail records. FERC, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AUDIT PROCESS 2 
(20), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/audit-process.pdf. 
788 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:771 
regarding corporate status, with the goal of finding the proper regulated entity 
responsible for potential corporate noncompliance or cheating. EPA often 
requests information about parent corporations, successor liability, and asset 
purchase agreements to determine which regulated entity is liable for cleanup of 
a hazardous waste site.98 While agencies are not always explicit as to the exact 
purpose of a specific information collection effort, corporate legal counsel, who 
keep tabs on the kinds of enforcement matters particular agencies are pursuing, 
often inform regulated entities that a particular information request has likely 
been issued to detect noncompliance or cheating.99 Research has shown that 
corporate entities are more likely to mount challenges to information requests 
that are enforcement-related.100  
Remote sensing technologies have been particularly useful in detection of 
corporate cheating at natural gas fracking sites.101 For example, in fall of 2019, 
the EPA enforcement office, along with state enforcement offices, conducted 
helicopter flyovers over the Permian gas shale in the western part of the United 
States.102 Enforcement officials used infrared cameras to identify leaks from 
flares, tanks, and other types of equipment.103 Of the 530 flares observed, 
thirteen were unlit and emitting methane and other pollutants.104 In response, the 
enforcement agencies sent written notices to seven oil and gas operators seeking 
further information regarding the leaks.105 As described later in Part IV, 
maritime agencies in the European Union have also been using remote sensing 
technologies to detect corporate cheating on SO2 air pollution standards in the 
shipping industry.106 Remote sensors sit on top of bridges or aircrafts such as 
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 101. See ENV’T INTEGRITY PROJECT, CLEAN AIR ACT VIOLATIONS AT SIX OIL & GAS COMPANIES: 
EPA’S ENFORCEMENT BENEFITS OKLAHOMA-BASED CORPORATIONS, 3–4 (July 23, 2018), http://www.
environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Report-to-EPA-on-oil-and-gas-enforcement.pdf. 
 102. Environment Department Identifies Potential Emissions Violations from Oil and Gas 
Operators, KRWG (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.krwg.org/post/environment-department-identifies-
potential-emissions-violations-oil-and-gas-operators (noting that “as part of NMED’s ongoing 
compliance assurance activities, helicopter flyovers were conducted in conjunction with the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in September and October of 2019”). 
 103. New Mexico Puts Oil and Gas Firms on Notice Due to Methane, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 
(Jan. 15, 2020, 12:28 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/new-mexico/articles/2020-01-15/
new-mexico-puts-oil-and-gas-firms-on-notice-due-to-methane. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. See Gary Vegh, CEMS  Why Every Minute Matters for Environmental Compliance, EHS 
TODAY (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.ehstoday.com/environment/article/21915590/cems-why-every-
minute-matters-for-environmental-compliance (discussing examples of remote sensing in the European 
Union); See, e.g., Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships , 33 U.S.C. § 1908(b)(2). 
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light planes or drones and read various parameters, such as SO2 concentration, 
from the exhaust of the ships passing underneath to detect potential cheaters. 
Some types of remote sensors rely on the ability to physically pull a sample of 
the exhaust stream through analyzers.107 Other remote sensing relies on optical 
analyzers, which do not need to be directly inside the exhaust stream but can 
instead be as much as ten to thirty meters away from the exhaust stream.108 
Remote sensing surveys can be an effective use of enforcement resources to 
target particular potential violators. 
Further, agencies also collect information relevant to noncompliance and 
cheating from third-party individuals with unique access to corporations and 
corporate facilities. Third parties with access to the corporate entity can obtain 
helpful information about the corporate entity and pass it to agency officials, 
often through tip lines.109 Indeed, the same kinds of remote sensing technologies 
used by agencies are used by citizens groups to detect corporate cheating. 110 The 
Volkswagen scandal, in particular, came to the attention of EPA through 
scientists from a university lab.111 In addition, citizens’ groups have sent photos 
taken with personal drones to agency officials, prompting the agencies to send 
inspectors to the facilities.112 Private research companies are also developing 
new technologies that have the potential to provide information to agency 
enforcement officials; for example, researchers with SkyTruth collected multiple 
satellite images of an oil spill, eventually prompting a USCG cleanup order to 
Taylor Energy.113 
 
 107. Steve Roman, Pollution Police  How Are Ship Emissions Monitored?, WÄRTSILÄ (July 24, 
2019), https://www.wartsila.com/twentyfour7/environment/pollution-police-how-are-ship-emissions-
monitored.  
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Report Suspected Securities Fraud or Wrongdoing, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/tcr (last visited Oct. 1, 2020); Contact Hotline Staff Anonymously, FED. ENERGY 
REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/enforcement-legal/enforcement/enforcement-hotline/contact-
hotline-staff-anonymously (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 110. Jonah M. Kessel & Hiroko Tabuchi, It’s a Vast, Invisible Climate Menace. We Made It Visible., 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/12/climate/texas-methane-
super-emitters.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share; Using FLIR Cameras to Show Oil & Gas Air Pollution  
Seeing Is Believing!, HALT THE HARM NETWORK (Apr. 17, 2018), https://halttheharm.net/event/using-
flir-cameras-to-show-oil-gas-air-pollution-seeing-is-believing/. 
 111. Jason Bisnoff, Volkswagen Scandal Findings Can Be Traced Back to Last Year in West Virginia, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.nydailynews.com/autos/news/volkswagen-scandal-
discovered-west-virginia-year-article-1.2371162. 
 112. See Investigation Reveals Illegal Activity at Morgantown Coal Plant on the Potomac River, 
POTOMAC RIVERKEEPER NETWORK (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.potomacriverkeepernetwork.org/
morgantown/. Professors Lee Paddock and Robert Glicksman have also written about such tips, citing, for 
example, the story of a drone hobbyist who documented massive unfiltered discharges of animal blood 
from a Dallas, Texas, meat packing plant into a nearby river and reported the images to agency officials. 
See, e.g., George Wyeth et al., The Impact of Citizen Environmental Science in the United States, 49 ENV’T 
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10237, 10247 (2019).  
 113. John Amos, Taylor Energy Oil Spill  This Is How Change Happens, SKYTRUTH (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://skytruth.org/2018/12/taylor-energy-oil-spill-this-is-how-change-happens/; Lorraine Chow, Clean 
Up 14-Year Oil Spill or Face $40K Daily Fine, Feds Tell Taylor Energy, ECOWATCH (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.ecowatch.com/taylor-oil-spill-cleanup-gulf-2621075177.html. Oily water discharge rules 
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Third-party information also comes from investigative journalists, local 
government agencies, and whistleblowers. Investigative journalists have helped 
uncover insider trading.114 Local government authorities often work in close 
proximity to regulated entity facilities. For example, a case involving an Idaho 
resident who kept hazardous materials at his home without a permit was initially 
discovered by the local fire department, which was responding to nuisance 
complaints about the condition of the property.115 Whistleblowers have 
dominated as third-party tip providers in multiple areas of corporate cheating.116 
Several federal statutes provide whistleblowers with protection and potentially 
large financial awards.117 In response to large-scale corporate violations, 
Congress has often responded by increasing whistleblower protection within 
specific statutes.118 A simple look at the enforcement websites for the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and SEC reveals that many 
enforcement cases originated with whistleblowers.119 In addition, some of the 
most prominent USCG enforcement cases in shipping involving “magic pipes,” 
or illegal bypass of a ship’s oil water separator,120 have originated with 
whistleblowers.121 
 
have been hard to prosecute because the crime often happens far from shore. See “Magic Pipe” MARPOL 
Violations Can Be Spotted from Space, MARITIME EXEC. (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/magic-pipe-marpol-violations-can-be-spotted-from-space (“With no one present to 
sight an oily sheen, and no monetary incentive for the crew to report wrongdoing, it has historically been 
easy to hide . . . SkyTruth has pioneered the use of radar satellite data to spot the distinctive slicks of bilge 
discharge on the water, with a tiny dot of a ship clearly visible at the head of the line. By time-matching 
the imagery with AIS data, the group’s researchers can make a good estimate of the identity of the [specific 
responsible] ship.”).  
 114. See generally Michael J. Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311, 331 (2007).  
 115. United States v. Spatig, 870 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 116. Nancy M. Modesitt, Causation in Whistleblowing Claims, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193 
(2016); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AVOIDING AND RESPONDING TO MISCONDUCT § 10.01 (Law Journal 
Press 2018). Compared to other areas of corporate oversight, EPA seems to provide relatively fewer 
incentives for environmental whistleblowers. Daniel Purtell, Considering Rewards for Environmental 
Whistleblowers, MCELDREW YOUNG PURTELL MERRITT (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.mceldrewyoung
.com/environmental-rewards-bp-fine/. 
 117. Clean Air Act, § 322, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2019); Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, §110, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2019); Clean Water Act, § 507, 33 U.S.C. § 
1367 (2019); Safe Drinking Water Act, § 1450, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2019); Toxic Substances Control 
Act, § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2019). 
 118. See Purtell, supra note 116 (reporting that “calls for reform of whistleblower procedures in the 
securities industry gained momentum because of the unsuccessful efforts of a hedge fund manager to 
expose the fraud on investors perpetuated by Bernie Madoff”). 
 119. Michael Brooks et al., FERC Proceeds with Enforcement Action against Total Gas & Power 
North America, BRACEWELL (May 3, 2016), https://www.energylegalblog.com/blog/2016/05/03/ferc-
proceeds-enforcement-action-against-total-gas-power-north-america. 
 120. An oil water separator is a filter that is used to treat the oil-water mixture from any compartment 
in the ship where water has accumulated, before discharging into the sea. See Oily Water Separator – 
Working and Construction, BRIGHT HUB ENG’G (Apr. 11, 2009), https://www.brighthubengineering.
com/marine-engines-machinery/31676-shipboard-oily-water-separators-how-do-they-work/. 
 121. In the United States, this is one of the most frequently prosecuted maritime crimes, thanks to 
generous whistleblower awards, the ease of finding physical evidence, and an enthusiasm for MARPOL 
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B. Agency Challenges 
It would seem that such broad legal authority and avenues for accessing 
information would leave agencies well equipped to detect corporate 
noncompliance and cheating. However, this is not so. The use of targeted records 
collection and inspection authority depends heavily on agency resource levels.122 
It takes significant time for agencies to conduct physical inspections, as 
inspectors may travel for extended periods, sifting through extensive paperwork 
and using complex equipment.123 Recently, in light of the coronavirus pandemic, 
agencies reported that they were halting field inspections because of health 
concerns about in-person investigations.124 Reduced enforcement budgets 
undoubtedly also have a significant impact on agency activity. Many 
environmental agencies have seen significant declines in resources devoted to 
basic inspection.125 For example, in its 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, EPA predicted 
that it would be forced to make 25 percent fewer compliance inspections and 
bring one-third fewer enforcement actions than it had in the years 2005 to 2009 
because of declining budgets. 126 Periodic federal government shutdowns also 
mean that fewer and fewer agency inspectors are out detecting violations.127 
While political administration changes may increase enforcement budgets at 
various points in time, there is generally pressure to do more with less within 
enforcement agency offices.128  
Targeted records collections are also prone to legal challenge, delays, or 
limitations in receipt of needed information. Regulated entities often argue that 
administrative records requests are too burdensome to fulfill.129 Regulated 
 
(Annex XXX) enforcement. See “Magic Pipe” MARPOL Violations Can Be Spotted from Space, supra 
note 113. 
 122. Van Loo, supra note 8, at 407 (describing generally the resources it takes for agencies to 
monitor). 
 123. Id. at 406; see also Light, supra note 75, at 146–49; Rechtschaffen, supra note 78, at 1215. 
 124. See Tony Barboza, How the Coronavirus is Hampering Enforcement of California’s Air 
Pollution Rules, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2020-
05-01/coronavirus-california-air-pollution-enfocement. 
 125. Madison Condon, Citizen Scientists, Data Transparency, and the Mining Industry, 32 NAT. RES. 
& ENV’T 24 (2017); Rechtschaffen, supra note 78, at 1214. 
 126. Coral Davenport, Shutdown Means E.P.A. Pollution Inspectors Aren’t on the Job, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/climate/epa-pollution-inspection-shutdown.html. 
 127. See id. Other reports have noted the impact of shutdowns on nonenvironmental agencies. The 
Wall Street Journal reported in the summer of 2019 that the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, which investigates and regulates workplaces for health and safety issues, had the fewest 
inspectors in decades. See Alex Leary, Trump Administration Pushes to Deregulate with Less 
Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2019, 7:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-
pushes-to-deregulate-with-less-enforcement-11561291201.  
 128. See Abby Smith & Josh Siegel, Daily on Energy  Wheeler Tells Democrats the EPA Can Do 
More with Less, WASH. EXAM’R (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy
/daily-on-energy-wheeler-tells-democrats-the-epa-can-do-more-with-less. 
 129. See Motion to Quash and/or Limit Subpoena Duces Tecum, In re Graco, No. 9350 (F.T.C. 
2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/01/120118moquashlimitsubpdutec.
pdf; EEOC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 757 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that the Equal 
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entities also argue that administrative records requests are outside the scope of 
agency authority.130 While agencies often ultimately win such legal challenges, 
judges may limit the scope of the requests, thereby impacting the agencies’ 
access to information that might help in detection of potential corporate 
cheating.131 Further, a legal challenge itself, even if the agency might ultimately 
win, can be risky for agencies.132 After all, it only takes one judge limiting the 
scope of information-gathering authority to set a precedent that impacts 
agencies’ future information requests. 
Inspections, like information requests, are prone to legal challenges. To be 
sure, courts have interpreted agency inspection authority broadly, particularly in 
relationship to challenges over privacy concerns. While the Fourth Amendment 
of the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures without a 
warrant, the Supreme Court has held that numerous exceptions apply to its 
applicability in a corporate context.133 Even when a warrant is required, courts 
have found that agencies need only obtain an administrative search warrant, 
which requires a lower probable cause standard than in the kind of warrant 
involved with searches of private individuals or in criminal matters.134 Courts 
 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s information request on employees discharged by Royal 
Caribbean Cruises in response to a disability discrimination suit in district court was unduly burdensome).  
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Xcel Energy, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Minn. 2010) (regulated 
entity challenging scope of authority for EPA information request). 
 131. See, e.g., id. (in a case involving a CAA information request to a coal-fired power plant, holding 
that EPA could only seek information about a corporate entity’s planned construction activities for a two-
year period, instead of the requested five-year period). 
 132. Andrew Park, The Endless Cycle of Corporate Crime and Why It’s So Hard to Stop, DUKE L. 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://law.duke.edu/news/endless-cycle-corporate-crime-and-why-its-so-hard-stop/ 
(observing that “[p]rosecutors have limited resources and generally only bring cases they believe they can 
win”). 
 133. While the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures most 
commonly arises in the context of private individuals, it also applies to corporate entities. See See v. 
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); David James, The Fourth Amendment, Future Methods of 
Environmental Enforcement, and Warrantless Inspections, 33 REV. LITIG. 183 (2014). However, 
numerous exceptions apply to this general rule, including, of particular relevance to agencies, the “open 
fields,” “pervasively regulated,” and “special needs” doctrines. See Steven A.G. Davison, Fourth 
Amendment and Statutory Limitations on Entry and Inspection of Commercial Property in Environmental 
Enforcement, 3 UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 75 (1982).  
 134. Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (explaining that probable 
cause for an administrative warrant exists if reasonable legislative or administrative standards are 
satisfied). Some statutes provide explicit language authorizing agencies to obtain warrants to obtain entry 
and access if a violation is suspected. See, e.g., FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136g(b) (2019) (authorizing officers 
or employees duly designated by EPA to obtain and execute warrants for the purposes of entry, inspection, 
and copying of records). Other statutes do not provide such clear language, though courts have largely 
held that agencies may seek administrative warrants anyway. See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc 
Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that EPA was not claiming a right to conduct 
a warrantless inspection as applied to “pervasively regulated” industries but instead justifiably relied on 
the CAA-specific provision allowing the agency to conduct inspections); In re Alameda County 
Assessor’s Parcel Nos. 537-801-2-4 & 537-850-9, 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that 
EPA has authority to seek an ex parte administrative warrant under section 308 of the CWA); In re Order 
Pursuant to § 3013(d) RCRA, 550 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (determining section 3013 of 
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recognize that “probable cause” in the criminal law sense is not required for an 
administrative warrant.135 Nonetheless, agencies still must demonstrate that 
there are reasonable neutral standards imposed on the inspection or that there is 
evidence of a violation.136  
Conducting random inspections at facilities usually requires a 
demonstration that the targeting is part of a general plan to pursue and eliminate 
suspected industry-wide violations.137 Agencies often announce “enforcement 
initiatives” that target particular kinds of violations or industries.138 For example, 
in 1999, EPA began a national enforcement initiative aimed at uncovering 
potential violations of the CAA within the coal-fired power plant sector.139 Over 
the next fifteen years, EPA proceeded to send records collection requests to 
virtually all coal plants, requesting that the entities send information that 
included data about emission levels for various pollutants, anticipated upgrades 
to the plants, and expected demand for power.140 After the Volkswagen scandal, 
EPA made “defeat device” cases one of the new national enforcement 
initiatives.141 However, designating national enforcement initiatives can be a 
lengthy process and depends largely on whatever priority a particular 
administration wants to pursue.  
Further, it is challenging for agencies to show that the target of the 
inspection is suspected of violations. Such a demonstration requires facts 
explaining the reason for the warrant request, the scope of the proposed 
inspection, and affidavits describing how the agency selected the particular 
facility for inspection.142 Thus, seeking an administrative warrant can be 
information and resource intensive.143 In one case, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) tried five times to conduct a voluntary inspection of a 
 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act allowed for entry, albeit at reasonable times, and created a 
system of ensuring reasonable advance notice to the regulated facility). 
 135. Camara, 387 U.S. at 523.  
 136. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). 
 137. Id.  
 138. See, e.g., National Compliance Initiatives, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/national-
compliance-initiatives (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 139. Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/coal-fired-
power-plant-enforcement (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 140. Id. 
 141. National Compliance Initiative  Stopping Aftermarket Defeat Devices for Vehicles and Engines, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/national-compliance-initiative-stopping-aftermarket-defeat-
devices-vehicles-and-engines (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (describing the new compliance initiative and 
also describing defeat devices as “hardware and software specifically designed to defeat required 
emissions controls on vehicles and engines”).  
 142. EPA, PRACTICE HANDBOOK: ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT 5 (2000). 
 143. In one case, it took just under one month from the time EPA applied for an administrative 
warrant under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act to the 
district court’s denial of the application. In re Yoder’s Slaughterhouse Site, 519 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D. 
Md. 2007). In another case involving suspected violations of the CWA, an initial inspection of public 
areas took place on March 9, and the ex-parte warrant was not issued until April 28. See In re Search 
Warrant, No. 04-00079-MPT, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10902, at *4 (D. Del. June 9, 2004). 
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regulated entity after a nationwide outbreak of salmonella was linked to a plant-
based food product distributed by the regulated entity.144 Despite evidence 
linking it to the contaminated plant-based food product, the regulated entity 
refused to cooperate with the FDA inspectors.145 The FDA thus sought to require 
the regulated entity to make statements and provide passwords for computers 
seized by the FDA.146 The regulated entity sought to quash the warrant.147 The 
court denied the FDA’s request to compel the regulated entity to speak with 
investigators on the grounds that the administrative warrant did not affirmatively 
require the regulated entity to engage in interviews; the warrant only authorized 
the seizure of records.148 However, as commentators on the decision noted, it is 
unclear whether the administrative warrant could have included an affirmative 
requirement to conduct interviews since the statute authorizing such inspections 
did not include anything about interviews.149 Notably, some outside counsel 
advise regulated entities to immediately file a motion to quash a warrant or seek 
an injunction challenging its scope if an FDA warrant includes things that are 
arguably out of scope.150  
Third-party tips from citizens, journalists, and whistleblowers also present 
challenges for agencies. Some agencies, particularly in the environmental 
context, doubt the credibility and rigor of information collected by private 
citizens.151 Reliance on whistleblowers, too, has proven untimely because often, 
the whistleblower employee reports to the enforcing agency only after they 
become dissatisfied with the employer.152 Whistleblowers can also be 
discounted if they are seen as disgruntled former employees.153 Whistleblowers 
can also be perceived as biased if the agency has promised to defer or forgo 
 
 144. In re Administrative Establishment Inspection, No. 1:18-MC-546, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65476 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019); see also Anne K. Walsh, Court Blesses FDA’s Rarely Used 
Administrative Search Warrant Authority, FDA BLOG (May 3, 2019), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
2019/05/court-blesses-fdas-rarely-used-administrative-search-warrant-authority/. 
 145. Walsh, supra note144. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Kathy Hardee, FDA’s Right to Take Photographs in Your Facility  Or Not, FOOD SAFETY MAG. 
(Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/enewsletter/fdae28099s-right-to-take-
photographs-in-your-facility-or-not/ (citing taking photographs as one example of an investigative activity 
that may be outside the scope of an administrative warrant).  
 151. See George Wyeth et al., The Impact of Citizen Environmental Science in the United States, 49 
ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,237, 10,244 (2019) (observing that “many officials are concerned 
that the studies citizen scientists conduct will not meet scientific standards” and “concerns remain that 
low-cost sensors and other technologies used by citizen scientists do not yet meet high accuracy 
standards”).   
 152. Kim G. Bruno, Should Affiliated Marketers Be Treated as Insiders?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 465, 468–
69 (2000).  
 153. Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out about Fraud  A Theoretical Analysis of Whistleblowing 
and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1914 (June 2007) (observing that “[w]hen, as is often the 
case, the whistleblower is a disgruntled employee, people are less inclined to believe the whistleblower’s 
story”). 
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action against them or provide them with financial compensation in exchange for 
their testimony.154 In addition, agency enforcement staff have to dedicate time 
and energy to regularly checking public tip lines and databases for whistleblower 
complaints and determining which complaints are serious or substantial.155 Such 
checks are important because complaints sometimes overreport small violations 
or overlook more significant violations.156 Thus, as this Part has shown, without 
better access to information, agency efforts to deter corporate cheating will have 
modest results. 
III.  MOVING TO SELF-MONITORING AND REPORTING 
This Part argues for a change in the detection of corporate cheating, from 
one that is solely focused on the role of agencies to one that places increased 
responsibility on regulated entities themselves. In particular, it advocates for 
increased mandatory self-monitoring and reporting obligations for regulated 
entities, so that agencies are able to receive continuous information about 
corporate behavior and activity. Such mandatory self-monitoring and reporting 
puts the onus on the owners of the requisite information—that is, the regulated 
entities themselves—to provide information that is responsive to detection of 
cheating.  
A. Increasing Detection 
If agencies had more continuous information through corporate self-
monitoring and reporting, it is likely they would more consistently detect 
noncompliance and cheating. The idea of shifting to a world where regulated 
entities self-monitor and report violations is not new. Indeed, the two major 
environmental statutes, the CWA and the CAA, contain self-monitoring and 
reporting programs. The CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System program requires regulated entities to self-monitor and send the results 
to EPA electronically in a “discharge monitoring report” (DMR).157 EPA’s 
regulatory program under the CAA’s acid rain program requires regulated 
entities to install continuous emission monitoring systems (CEMS) and send the 
results to EPA.158 While neither the DMR nor the acid rain database program is 
perfect, both provide EPA with ongoing information about corporate behavior 
 
 154. The Dodd-Frank Act established a reward program to provide financial compensation for any 
original information voluntarily provided to SEC that results in monetary sanctions of more than $1 
million. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2019). 
 155. U.S. SEC, DIV. OF ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 7 (2017). 
 156. See Bruno, supra note 153.  
 157. NPDES eReporting, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/compliance/npdes-ereporting (last visited Feb. 
13, 2020). 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a) (2019). A CEMS is a monitor installed on-site at or near the point of air 
pollution discharge. CEMS are the best method for measuring compliance because they are certified to 
high standards and contain continuous, real-time data of actual emissions. See Jim Hecker, The Difficulty 
of Citizen Enforcement of the Clean Air Act, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 303, 306 (2004). 
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and activity through self-admissions of liability.159 As has been discovered in 
the shipping industry in particular, with regard to oil spills, monitoring oil 
transfer operations has caused shipping crews to take more care because they 
know the relevant agency, the USCG, is watching.160 
Agencies have been able to gain similar benefits from mandatory self-
disclosures. For example, SEC requires issuers of registered securities and other 
financial instruments to issue annual 10-K reports.161 However, such mandatory 
disclosures often only provide cursory information about regulated entities, 
instead of detailed information that may be required to detect noncompliance or 
cheating.162 Thus, mandating general disclosures about corporate relationships 
and structure, like as required by SEC’s 10-Ks, is not enough. Mandating specific 
disclosures about actual violations, referred to here as self-monitoring and 
reporting, is where the shift needs to happen.  
Mandatory self-monitoring and reporting is different than mere self-
disclosures. While the terminology is often used interchangeably by agencies and 
in the literature, this Article advocates that all regulated entities be required to 
monitor for noncompliance and cheating and report any nefarious activity that is 
discovered. Self-monitoring and reporting allow agencies to see, from a 
computer screen, admissions of liability from regulated entities and know 
whether those admissions represent a significant deviation from the regulatory 
requirements. The key benefit of self-monitoring and reporting is that these 
methods move agencies away from the reactive, ad hoc approach to information 
collection. It is of little use to force agencies to wait to see if budgets will allow 
inspections or if a third-party tip coming through an agency hotline will prove 
 
 159. Frank M. Thomas Jr., Citizen Suits and the NPDES Program  A Review of Clean Water Act 
Decisions, 17 ENV’T L. REP. 10050, 10051 (1987) (explaining that in enforcement cases, district courts 
have simply compared terms of the discharging party’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
permit and corresponding data pulled from the DMR); Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado, Inc., 
894 F. Supp. 1455, 1461 (D. Colo. 1995) (“I hold that in this citizen action under the Clean Air Act 
violations of the 20% opacity standard may be established by CEM records and reports as that data carries 
with it high indicia of reliability and probative value”). 
 160. Marc A. Cohen, Oil Spills  The Deterrent Effects of Monitoring, Enforcement, and Public 
Information, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, (Apr. 20, 2009), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-
resources/oil-spills-the-deterrent-effects-of-monitoring-enforcement-and-public-information/.  
 161. See Robert H. Feller, Environmental Disclosure and the Securities Laws, 22 B.C. ENV’T AFF. 
L. REV. 225 (1995); Christopher J. Barry & Charles R. Blumenthal, Practical and Ethical Considerations 
in Counselling Clients Concerning Environmental Reporting and Disclosure, 38 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. 
INST. 4-1 (1992). 
 162. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that every issuer of a registered security, or 
financial instrument, report certain information to SEC and the corporation’s stockholders through 
electronic, web-based forms, such as the annual 10-K form. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78m (2018); see also Form 10-K  Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 OR 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. SEC 8-11, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2020). The Federal Power Act, too, requires public utilities to have their rates and charges 
on file in a convenient form and place, and FERC requires by regulation that such public utilities fulfill 
the requirement by submitting electronic, web-based, quarterly reports. Electric Quarterly Report Filing 
Requirements Guide, FERC, 4, 16 (Nov. 15, 2017), https://ferc.gov/docs-filing/eqr/eqr-requirements-
guide.pdf. 
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credible. Mandatory self-monitoring and reporting instead allow agencies to 
receive regular, consistent, and timely information without having to expend 
significant resources.  
Ongoing access to information about corporate behavior and activity is so 
important to enforcement agencies that they actively seek out opportunities to 
get it.163 For example, in settlement agreements for cases involving significant 
corporate cheating, enforcement agencies have required that the regulated 
entities implement mandatory internal corporate compliance programs that 
include regular self-monitoring and reporting to the relevant agency.164 The 
Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal settlement agreement required 
Volkswagen to establish an internal testing program of future vehicles and report 
the results of such tests to EPA and state environmental agencies on a periodic 
basis.165 In 2018, settlements with glass companies for violations of the CAA 
required that the companies install and operate CEMS and report the data to 
EPA.166 These settlements indicate that enforcement offices see value in 
receiving ongoing information about corporate behavior and activity even after 
detecting violations. The idea is that mandating such self-monitoring and 
reporting, even via settlement agreements, will help prevent the violations from 
recurring because it increases the likelihood that cheating will be detected.167  
Enforcement agencies also try to incentivize regulated entities to voluntarily 
self-monitor and report violations. EPA has an audit policy that allows corporate 
entities to self-report violations discovered by an internal audit in exchange for 
enforcement discretion or reduced penalties.168 State environmental agencies 
also encourage voluntary self-reporting of violations, sometimes promising 
specific penalty reduction credit that is determined on a fact-specific basis.169 
Multiple nonenvironmental agencies have similar enforcement discretion or 
penalty reduction programs; examples include FERC’s enforcement of energy 
 
 163. Root, supra note 6, at 213 (noting that “[t]he mandate to adopt certain compliance programs can 
come, as it did in the case of Hobby Lobby, through a settlement agreement, but mandates are also 
sometimes found directly within statutory or regulatory requirements”). 
 164. See, e.g., id. (discussing the compliance programs negotiated as part of the Hobby Lobby 
settlement); see also In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability 
Litigation, Third Partial Consent Decree, ¶ 15(e) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2017-01/documents/vwthirdpartial-cd.pdf (discussing the internal testing programs 
Volkswagen was required to implement as part of its settlement).  
 165. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, supra note 164. 
 166. See, e.g., Consent Decree ¶¶ 74–113, United States v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/anchorglasscontainercorp-
cd.pdf.  
 167. Rechtschaffen, supra note 78, at 1186; see also Darlene R. Wong, Stigma  A More Efficient 
Alternative to Fines in Deterring Corporate Misconduct, 3 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 3, ¶ 1 (2000). 
 168. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 
65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,619 (Apr. 11, 2000) (widely applicable to all federal regulations enforced by 
EPA) 
 169. See, e.g., N.J. DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT., Compliance and Enforcement Self-Disclosure Report 
(Rev. 2014), https://nj.gov/dep/enforcement/docs/sdreport-rev5-12-14.pdf.  
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market regulations and the Federal Aviation Administration’s enforcement of 
hazardous material regulations.170  
Indeed, self-monitoring and reporting are not perfect. There is always a 
concern that regulated entities will not be able to exercise independent judgment 
in self-reporting violations, resulting in underreporting or outright lying. As a 
result, some practitioners advocate for third-party or neutral human monitors to 
conduct the monitoring.171 In environmental matters, using measurement 
devices to conduct neutral testing and sampling can mitigate concerns about 
independence. Under the CWA, regulated entities that are required to send 
DMRs to environmental agencies must physically sample waters where facilities 
are discharging at specific parameters and locations.172 Regulated entities 
required to report CEMS data as part of the CAA acid rain program must install 
the CEMS in such a way as to ensure proper measurement of emissions.173 Thus, 
while not always foolproof, there are ways to help ensure that self-monitoring is 
objective and neutral.  
Ultimately, mandatory self-monitoring and reporting saves agency 
resources by allowing enforcement offices to better target key violators and key 
violations. Indeed, some of the academic literature has suggested that self-
monitoring and reporting, when it does occur, can reduce the need for agencies 
to check a particular regulated entity.174 Some empirical research suggests that 
agencies will assume that regulated entities that self-monitor and report are 
policing themselves adequately and will therefore simply leave them alone.175 
Thus, self-monitoring and reporting has significant advantages for an agency’s 
ability to detect violations. 
B. A Shift for Regulated Entities 
If self-monitoring and reporting is not new and has significant advantages 
for agency detection of cheating, why is such monitoring and reporting not 
mandated in the regulations themselves? A major part of the answer is likely that 
regulated entities fight against any mandatory requirements for self-monitoring 
 
 170. See Self-Reports, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/enforcement-
legal/enforcement/self-reports; Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/hazmat/air_carriers/report_incident/voluntary_disclosure/ (describing the penalty 
reduction policies of FERC and the Federal Aviation Administration, respectively). 
 171. See, e.g., John Hanson, FCPA Settlement Agreements, Monitors, and Self-Monitoring, THE 
FRAUD GUY (Aug. 1, 2011), https://thefraudguy.wordpress.com/2011/08/01/fcpa-settlement-agreements-
monitors-and-self-monitoring/ (arguing that “there is no ‘independent’ in self-reporting”).  
 172. See, e.g., Discharge Monitoring Reports, DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT., https://www.dep.pa.gov/
Business/Water/CleanWater/WastewaterMgmt/DischargeMonitoring/Pages/default.aspx. 
 173. 40 C.F.R. § 75 (1993).  
 174. David Markell, et al., Dynamic Governance in Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 
563, 580 (2016). 
 175. Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up  Does Voluntary Self-
Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing? 54 J.L. & ECON. 609 (2011) (finding that “regulators used 
self-reports of legal violations as a heuristic for identifying firms that are effectively policing their own 
operations, shifting enforcement resources away from those that voluntarily disclose”). 
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and reporting. After all, such requirements would probably result in increased 
detection of violations, including both substantive violations and violations 
associated with the monitoring and reporting requirement themselves. In 
addition, more monitoring and reporting requirements could increase short-term 
compliance costs for regulated entities dealing with technical problems of 
monitoring equipment.176 However, this Article suggests that such thinking is 
short-sighted. Self-monitoring and reporting can benefit regulated entities in 
underappreciated ways, particularly in industries where a significant number of 
regulated entities publish environmental and social responsibility codes of 
conduct.  
Detection of corporate cheating through self-reporting and monitoring 
requirements promotes a level playing field in the long run for regulated entities 
that comply. Because compliance can be costly, corporate players gain a 
significant competitive advantage in a given marketplace by avoiding the costs 
involved with complying.177 Allowing corporate cheaters to avoid the cost of 
compliance undermines fundamental notions of fairness in the marketplace. The 
desire to maintain a level playing field informs enforcement decisions on 
multiple levels, including at the beginning, when agencies make decisions as to 
where and how to begin targeting for records collection or inspection.178 
Indeed, the cost of compliance is real, and as a result there remains an 
incentive to avoid that cost in order to get ahead. Volkswagen, for example, saw 
that compliance with new EPA nitrogen oxide (NOx) standards was not going to 
allow it to sell diesel cars in the United States.179 Since the mid-1970s, EPA has 
introduced progressively more stringent emissions standards for cars.180 The 
requirements for model year 2004 were among the toughest ever, requiring car 
 
 176. Environmental audits can cost very small, simple facilities about $2,500 and very large, 
complicated facilities about $40,000. The True Cost of an Environmental Audit, RES. MGMT. ASSOCS., 
https://www.rmagreen.com/rma-blog/price-cost-of-an-environmental-audit (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 177. See, e.g., Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the Ethics and Compliance Initiative 
Annual Conference (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-
delivers-remarks-ethics-and-compliance-initiative-annual (pledging to enforce the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act to ensure an “even playing field for law-abiding companies”); see also Rechtschaffen, supra 
note 78, at 1223–24 (“If, however, only some companies within an industry are permitted to evade such 
control requirements, . . . the evaders can unfairly obtain an advantage over their competitors, who will in 
response quickly resist making continued or additional pollution control investments themselves.” 
(quoting George Van Cleve & Keith W. Holman, Promise and Reality in the Enforcement of the Amended 
Clean Air Act Part II  Federal Enforceability and Environmental Auditing, 27 ENV’T L. REP. (ENV’T L. 
INST.) 10,151, 10,157 (1997) (alteration in original))). 
 178. For example, EPA’s national enforcement initiatives have often targeted a particular industrial 
sector for investigations, in part so that all similarly situated competitors are treated equally in 
enforcement. See, e.g., EPA Enforcement  National Petroleum Refinery Initiative, EPA (Feb. 11, 2011), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/refineryinitiative-powerpoint021111.pdf 
(commenting on the “level playing field” in describing the national enforcement initiative for the refining 
sector). 
 179. Leah McGrath Goodman, Why Volkswagen Cheated, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2015, 1:01 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/25/why-volkswagen-cheated-404891.html. 
 180. Id.  
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companies to slash the amount of NOx from tailpipe emissions by more than 94 
percent.181 The new standards posed an enormous challenge to automakers 
looking to offer diesel cars to the U.S. market.182 Meanwhile, in Europe, where 
emissions standards are not as strict as in the United States, more than 50 percent 
of vehicles sold were diesels.183 Volkswagen’s rivals, including Mazda, Honda, 
Nissan, and Hyundai, also had their eyes on the U.S. diesel market—but they 
took one look at EPA’s new standards and decided to scrap their plans.184 The 
main challenge, several of the companies said, was that it was too difficult to 
meet the new standards while maintaining engine performance and staying on 
budget.185 Volkswagen, on the other hand, decided to flout the new NOx 
standards and thus became the top seller of diesel cars in the United States.186  
While achievement of expected public benefit is a laudable goal of 
enforcement, a completely separate goal involving fairness is also important. 
Enforcement agencies in both Democratic and Republican administrations 
emphasize the need for a level playing field in enforcement, so cheaters do not 
gain an advantage. During the Obama administration, lead enforcement officials 
described the importance of a level playing field.187 Even the Trump 
administration, not otherwise known for promoting the environmental benefit of 
enforcement, promotes the level playing field benefit of enforcement.188 Industry 
associations also promote the idea that there should be a level playing field in 
enforcement.189 Thus, if nothing else, fairness and a level playing field should 
be part of the enforcement scholarship conversation.  
Regulated entities continue to stress the importance of “regulatory 
certainty” in interactions with agencies. Regulated entities have made 
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 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Oversight of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement and Compliance Programs  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 114th Cong. 11 (2016) (Testimony of 
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those health protections and to ensure that the companies that play by the rules are not put at an unfair 
competitive disadvantage”). 
 188. See, e.g., Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Trevor N. McFadden Speaks at 
Anti-Corruption, Export Controls & Sanctions 10th Compliance Summit, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 18, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-trevor-n-
mcfadden-speaks-anti (“FCPA prosecutions are intended to level the playing field for honest businesses 
that are undercut by businesses that engage in corrupt behavior.”). 
 189. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 2 (2015), https://www.
centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/021882_SEC_Reform_FIN1.pdf (noting that 
“[t]he mission of the SEC is to promote investor protection, competition, and capital formation. Capital 
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“regulatory certainty” arguments to agency officials for one key reason: 
planning. Regulated entities that own facilities subject to environmental 
regulation need to plan for facility upgrades and debt repayment schedules.190 
For example, regulated entities that own coal plants cite needs to plan investment 
and research and development choices, including whether to upgrade plants to 
keep them running, switch to other fuel sources, or evaluate carbon capture 
technologies.191 Arguably, enforcement certainty is part and parcel of regulatory 
certainty. Indeed, in one of former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt’s first 
speeches to agency staff, he stressed the importance of regulatory certainty, 
stating, “Regulators exist to give certainty to those that they regulate. Those that 
we regulate ought to know what we expect of them, so that they can plan and 
allocate resources to comply.”192  
In general, more information in the hands of agencies simply allows 
agencies to do their jobs more effectively, enhancing performance and 
confidence in the market.193 Thus, trade associations for regulated entities should 
work with their members to develop agreement to advocate for increased 
monitoring and reporting. Industry trade associations have a significant impact 
on agency regulations. Agencies are often in regular contact with regulated 
entities through trade associations to discuss a wide range of concerns, including 
compliance, cheating, disclosure, and new technologies.194 
Additionally, increased monitoring and reporting may help provide 
regulated entities a greater understanding of terminology used in contracts 
between two private parties. As scholars have described, regulated entities with 
a corporate social responsibility focus are increasingly including compliance as 
a factor in deciding which suppliers to purchase goods from or work with.195 
Regulated entities might include in a “vendor code of conduct” a provision that 
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Climate, 2009 WL 1008507 (Aspatore 2009). 
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requires vendors to comply with all relevant laws.196 Regulated entities might 
also obtain credit agreements that include provisions that require borrowers to be 
compliant.197 However, it is entirely unclear how the term “compliance” is 
defined in such codes of conduct and credit agreements. The suggestion here is 
that regulated entities, if they were to self-disclose more consistently, could rely 
on such self-disclosure as a basis for determining whether the relevant party in a 
private-private agreement was indeed meeting compliance requirements. 
Without the requisite information to detect noncompliance, it is unlikely that the 
contractual requirement to “comply” will be meaningfully enforced or used as 
the basis of a breach of contract claim.  
These are new ideas of how regulated entities benefit from increased self-
monitoring and reporting. It should not be that investors alone clamor for 
increased self-disclosure requirements by SEC about matters that impact the 
environment. It also should not be that public interest groups and pro-
environmental legal scholars alone push for more requirements that regulated 
entities sample water discharges or measure air emissions and report the results. 
Because the regulated entities themselves can also benefit from such reporting 
and verification by creating a level playing and enforceable contracts, it 
behooves the regulated entities to also sound the bell for increased monitoring 
and reporting requirements.  
C. Anticipated Problems 
Mandatory self-monitoring and reporting is not the perfect solution to 
detecting corporate cheating. Simply managing large amounts of information 
coming to agencies in multiple forms is overwhelming. More information can 
place an additional burden on agencies struggling to process and analyze 
incoming information.198 Indeed, a significant criticism of existing mandatory 
self-monitoring and reporting tools is that even when these violations are 
obvious, the agencies still have inadequate resources to follow up and issue fines 
or file cases for actual enforcement. For example, a report on the Safe Drinking 
Water Act criticizes agencies for failure to do anything about violations that are 
blatantly obvious as a result of a self-monitoring and reporting system.199 Thus, 
complicated issues still arise regarding prioritization of enforcement cases. 
While such prioritization is not the subject of this Article, it is an area of concern 
for any proposal to mandate self-monitoring and reporting to agencies.  
At a more basic level, many government agencies are behind the curve when 
it comes to computing power and may simply not have the ability to receive self-
 
 196. See Einhorn, supra note 195. 
 197. Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2052–53 
(2005).  
 198. Glicksman et al., supra note 81, at 82 (arguing that “[i]f agencies are to take advantage of these 
new streams of data, they will need to develop protocols for collecting, storing, processing, and using the 
information”). 
 199. FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 41, at 11. 
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monitoring data and reports. For example, according to an analysis by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, three-quarters of the federal government’s 
current spending on information technology goes to supporting legacy systems—
“that is, to ‘increasingly obsolete’ systems that are dependent on ‘outdated 
software languages and hardware.’”200 Without upgraded electronic platforms to 
receive information, simply increasing requirements for monitoring and 
reporting will be for naught. To be sure, some agencies, such as FERC, have 
made large advances in their ability to receive information electronically. 
FERC’s annual report in 2017 noted a significant increase in referrals for formal 
enforcement because of data analytics that rely on advanced electronic reporting 
systems.201 Such electronic reporting allows FERC to use computer programs 
that pull out of periodic corporate disclosures specific information that might 
help the agency detect corporate cheating.202  
However, a seemingly simple transition to electronic reporting is not always 
straightforward. Forcing agencies to move self-disclosures or self-reporting from 
paper to electronic forms would require a time-consuming rulemaking effort that 
could raise fierce opposition. For example, only in 2015 did EPA begin to require 
that regulated agencies submit DMRs via a web-based electronic system.203 The 
rulemaking effort took almost two years.204 In 2016, FERC issued a proposed 
rule to streamline data collection needed to regulate market-based rates.205 The 
rule, among other things, would have required corporate entities that trade virtual 
products to report information regarding their legal and financial connections.206 
The agency had discovered that information regarding the legal and contractual 
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relationships among market participants was essential for watching wholesale 
market trading activity and potentially manipulative acts.207 After industry 
complained about difficulties and burdens associated with the increased 
reporting, FERC did not adopt that portion in the final rule.208 
In addition, some self-monitoring systems, like CEMS, struggle with 
technical or emotional concerns. For example, CEMS are subject to tampering 
by individual employees. In one criminal case involving a CEMS on a natural 
gas power plant, the general manager directed their employees, over a period of 
years, to tamper with the CEMS to save money, delay repairs, and avoid 
reporting to federal and state regulators that the plant, at times, was releasing 
certain pollutants in excess of its legal limits.209 However, arguments against 
CEMS have also involved an emotional reaction; regulated entities simply do not 
want to be watched at all times.  
Another key issue of concern for regulated entities regarding monitoring 
and reporting is whether such information will be publicly available. This 
Article, in Part I, began with the premise that the information needed for 
detection is inside information about what happens within a regulated entity or 
facility owned/operated by a regulated entity. However, as soon as such 
information reaches agencies, public transparency laws may dictate release of 
the information to the public, either upon specific request or as a matter of 
routine. The public accessibility of otherwise private information raises multiple 
issues that cannot be ignored.210  
At the same time, public release of monitoring and other reporting 
information can have a positive impact on detection (and deterrence) of corporate 
cheating. Monitoring and reporting data under both the DMR and CAA acid rain 
programs are publicly available through open websites.211 The public 
accessibility of the data has allowed citizen groups to bring enforcement cases 
under the CWA and CAA citizen suit provisions.212 Further, even in regulatory 
 
 207. Richard Glick, Commissioner, FERC, Dissent in Part Regarding Data Collection for Analytics 
and Surveillance and Market-Based Rate Purposes (July 18, 2019), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/
news/commissioner-richard-glick-dissent-part-regarding-data-collection-analytics-and-0.  
 208. Id.  
 209. United States v. Baker, No. 3:15-cr-30002-MGM, 2015 WL 8216041 (D. Mass. 2015).  
 210. Some companies have raised concerns about release of confidential business information when 
emissions information is publicly accessible. See, e.g., Coal Combustion Residuals Impoundment 
Assessment Reports, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-06/documents/ccr_impoundmnt
_asesmnt_rprts.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) (“Some companies have at some point claimed some 
information they have provided to the EPA related to their coal ash impoundments is confidential business 
information (CBI)”). However, many statutes place limits on what information may be considered 
confidential. For example, the CAA 114(c) states that emissions information may not be considered 
confidential, and 40 C.F.R. § 82.182 allows EPA to disclose information for which the regulated party has 
not submitted a claim of confidentiality at the time of data submission.  
 211. See Air Markets Program Data, EPA, https://ampd.epa.gov/ampd/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2020); 
Enforcement and Compliance History Online, supra note 39. 
 212. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (D. Colo. 
1995) (“The issue, then, is whether in this citizen’s enforcement action the CEM data and reports constitute 
evidence of emissions violations. If they do then no reasonable trier of fact could fail to conclude that 
2020] DETECTING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL CHEATING 805 
areas where the relevant federal statute does not have citizen suit provisions, 
public accessibility to monitoring and reporting data has the potential to change 
behavior of the regulated entity.213  
IV.  SHIPPING CASE STUDY 
This Part provides a detailed case study on an area in which mandatory self-
monitoring and reporting would increase the detection of corporate cheating: the 
shipping industry and the related SO2 emission standards. It advocates for the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to require that all ships self-monitor 
using CEMS and report the data through the existing automated information 
system (AIS). It focuses on why regulated shipping entities in particular should 
want to advance such a proposal, despite the fact that at first glance, it may not 
appear to be beneficial to their financial bottom line. 214  
A. Framing the Case Study 
Because ships in international commerce sail from one jurisdiction to 
another, national regulations by themselves are not effective in regulating 
pollution from these ships. Therefore, parties to the IMO established the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL).215 Annex VI of MARPOL contains air pollution regulations 
applicable to ships. SO2 air pollution is limited by regulating the kind of fuel that 
a ship can burn.216 Pursuant to MARPOL Annex VI, when a ship operates in a 
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competent evidence of ongoing emissions violations.”). In addition, particularly relevant for the case study 
in this Article is that the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships includes a citizen suit provision that has not 
been used. See 33 U.S.C. § 11 (1910).  
 213. Niefer, supra note 97, at 394 (“Another benefit of publishing market information is that if 
market participants know that information concerning their behavior will be public, they may be less 
inclined to manipulate markets or exercise undue market power. For example, if information about an 
individual generators’ offers into an ISO-run auction market will be made public, the generator may be 
reluctant to submit offers for a generating unit that substantially exceed the units’ costs for fear of drawing 
the attention of regulators, buyers, or the public.”). 
 214. This Article uses the term “regulated shipping entities” generally to denote the particular 
shipping company or companies that are responsible for compliance with SO2 standards. The authors 
acknowledge that there might be multiple kinds of shipping companies ultimately responsible for 
compliance, including owners, operators, and charters, but use the more general term “regulated shipping 
entities” for ease and in order to make the broader points in this Article.  
 215. All ships that are registered or flagged in a country that is party to MARPOL must abide by 
MARPOL requirements. Over 170 countries are party to MARPOL, including the United States. IMO, 
STATUS OF IMO TREATIES 111–15 (2020), http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOf
Conventions/Documents/Status%20-%202020.pdf.  
 216. Bunker fuel—the fuel typically used in large ocean-going ships—is a mixture of petroleum-
based fuel oils. Heavy fuel oil typically has higher sulfur content than distillate fuels, such as marine gas 
oil, which is similar in sulfur content to diesel. See, e.g., Dudley Curtis, Sulphur in Marine Fuels, 
TRANSPORT & ENV’T (Jan. 25, 2012) https://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/sulphur-
marine-fuels. 
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designated “emission control area (ECA),” it cannot burn fuel with a sulfur 
content of greater than 0.10 percent (the “ECA standard”).217 Prior to January 1, 
2020, however, when the same ship moved to operate in the high seas, outside 
of an ECA, it could burn a much dirtier fuel, at up to 3.5 percent sulfur content.218 
As of January 1, 2020, the maximum sulfur content of fuel on the open seas 
dropped to 0.50 percent (the “2020 global standard”).219  
While the basic SO2 requirements seem clear, MARPOL contains many 
complicating factors for determining potential noncompliance. First, a ship does 
not need to comply directly with the ECA standard or the 2020 global standard 
if it is equipped with an approved onboard stack gas “scrubber” system.220 
Second, operators can use an acceptable alternative marine fuel such as liquefied 
natural gas or methanol, instead of meeting the ECA standard or the 2020 global 
fuel standard.221 In addition, operators may receive special enforcement 
considerations if they can demonstrate that fuel that is compliant with the ECA 
standard or the 2020 global standard was not available and if the operator submits 
a fuel oil nonavailability report to the incoming port of call.222 Thus, determining 
compliance with MARPOL SO2 requirements is not always clear.  
The incentive for regulated shipping entities to cheat on SO2 standards is 
high because of the extreme price differential between compliant and 
noncompliant fuels. To be sure, the price differential of fuel changes frequently, 
and as a result the incentive to cheat changes frequently as well. In the month of 
February 2020 alone, for example, the price differential between high sulfur and 
low sulfur fuel “dropped $82/mt [metric ton], from $181/mt on February 3 to 
$99/mt on February 28.”223 Yet, in early September 2019, ECA compliant fuel 
 
 217. An ECA is defined as a boundary at a distance from a country’s shoreline, within which 
additional air pollution requirements apply. MARPOL includes four ECAs: the North American ECA, the 
North Sea ECA, the Baltic Sea ECA, and the Caribbean ECA. Other countries may opt to create or join 
an ECA. For example, China has formed a domestic ECA for the South China Sea and may seek IMO 
approval to create an ECA under MARPOL. Air Pollution, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/
OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Air-Pollution.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 
2020). 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. This Article does not delve into the merits of the fuel-based standards. One could argue, for 
example, that movement to an emissions-based standard would be better, so that ships have to meet a 
certain level of SO2 pollution on average over a specified time period and the compliance mechanism does 
not matter. However, that is not the issue addressed by this Article.  
 220. A scrubber is a piece of equipment that sprays alkaline water into a ship’s exhaust to remove 
sulfur and other unwanted chemicals. See, IMO, MEPC.259(68), 2015 GUIDELINES FOR EXHAUST GAS 
CLEANING SYSTEMS (2015) http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/
AirPollution/Documents/MEPC.259(68).pdf.  
 221. Broadly Applicable Approved Alternative Test Methods, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/emc/
broadly-applicable-approved-alternative-test-methods (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).  
 222. See Sulphur 2020 Implementation – IMO Issues Additional Guidance, INT’L MARINE ORG. 
(May 20, 2019), http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/10-MEPC-74-sulphur-
2020.aspx.  
 223. Charlotte Bucchioni & Britt Russell-Webster, Scrubbers Bet Pays Off for Shipowners as Marine 
Fuels Spread Remains Wide, S&P GLOBAL PLATTS INSIGHT (Mar. 3, 2020) https://blogs.platts.com/2020
/03/03/scrubbers-bet-pays-off-for-shipowners-as-marine-fuels-spread-remains-wide/. 
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was almost twice as expensive as worldwide fuel (fuel that is legal to use in other 
than ECA areas) for a ship fueling in Rotterdam, a major fueling port in the 
Netherlands.224 As stated by one researcher, “noncompliance may be the 
N[umber] 1 response to the new standards . . . . You make money by being 
noncompliant . . . .”225 An official from one major shipping company stated in 
an anonymous telephone interview that it will cost the company $300 million per 
year to comply.226 Undoubtedly, the economic incentives to cheat can be very 
high.  
At a December 2019 public hearing held by USCG, the Vice President of 
Environmental Policy at the World Shipping Council, a trade industry 
association, warned that minimal enforcement of new SO2 air pollution standards 
coming into effect in 2020 would likely result in corporate cheating.227 The 
industry needs a reason to comply.228 Further, the 2020 global standard will 
displace more than two million barrels per day of high sulfur fuel from the global 
marine fuel pool in the first year of the rule’s implementation, assuming effective 
enforcement measures that will minimize cheating.229 As one analysis shows, 
“many analysts are predicting between 10–20 percent noncompliance in the first 
year of implementation. This is a staggeringly high percentage . . . .”230  
Indeed, while the European Union has reported a less than 5 percent 
noncompliance rate, it is unclear whether the low percentage truly illustrates low 
corporate cheating or instead the difficulty in detecting noncompliance.231 For 
example, USCG has assumed low violation rates in analyzing the shipping 
industry’s compliance with SO2 air pollution regulations, but it conducts very 
 
 224. Rotterdam Bunker Prices, SHIP & BUNKER, https://shipandbunker.com/prices/emea/nwe/nl-
rtm-rotterdam#VLSFO (last visited Feb. 28, 2020). For example, IFO (intermediate fuel oil) 380 was 
reported to cost $280/MT, while very low sulfur fuel oil (VLSFO) was reported to cost $500/MT. Id. The 
slowdown in the world economy, and its impact on shipping as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic has 
greatly reduced the price differential between high sulfur and lower sulfur marine fuels. See, e.g., Scrubber 
Advocates Shift Focus to Environmental Case as HSFO Discount Narrows, SHIP & BUNKER (Mar. 23, 
2020), https://shipandbunker.com/news/emea/389011-scrubber-advocates-shift-focus-to-environmental-
case-as-hsfo-discount-narrows. However, the authors believe the price differential will return to historic 
levels as economies recover. 
 225. Laura Blewitt, World’s Dirtiest Fuel Seen Holding Out Even as Ships Clean Up, BLOOMBERG 
(May 11, 2017, 5:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-09/world-s-dirtiest-fuel-
seen-holding-out-even-as-ships-clean-up.  
 226. See telephone interview, supra note 18. 
 227. See Notice of Public Meeting on Consistent Implementation of Regulation 14.1.3 of MARPOL 
Annex VI (Global 0.50% Sulfur Limit), 84 Fed. Reg. 64,094 (Nov. 20, 2019). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Ralph Grimmer, Expected Pricing and Economic Impacts of the IMO 2020 Rule, STILLWATER 
ASSOCS. (July 11, 2018), https://stillwaterassociates.com/expected-pricing-and-economic-impacts-of-the-
imo-2020-rule/. 
 230. IMO 2020 Enforcement  Magic Pipe Cases All-Over Again?, HELLENIC SHIPPING NEWS (Nov. 
28, 2019), https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/imo-2020-enforcement-magic-pipe-cases-all-over-
again/. 
 231. Reducing Sulphur Emissions from Ships  The Impact of International Regulation, INT’L TRANSP. 
FORUM 41 (2016), https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/sulphur-emissions-shipping.pdf. 
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little actual testing.232 As a result, the real rate may be quite a bit higher than the 
reported rate. In contrast, the Netherlands, in its 2017 report on SO2 compliance, 
shows a violation rate of 21 percent for ships where samples were taken and 
analyzed. 233 These ships in violation represented about 5 percent of all ships 
where Dutch authorities conducted onboard inspections.234 Denmark has also 
reported violations that exceed 20 percent of the standard.235 These are not trivial 
violation rates.  
Cheating on the SO2 standards in shipping has significant implications for 
public health and natural resources. Scientists have long documented the huge 
deleterious human health impacts from SO2.236 SO2 is also a precursor for 
particulate matter pollution, and several densely populated urban areas of the 
United States and the world already have unhealthy levels of particle 
pollution.237 Ships are a large contributor to SO2 pollution overall, and emissions 
from ocean-going ships affect large areas.238 Indeed, during the formation of the 
North American ECA, EPA estimated that annual benefits in 2020 would include 
preventing between 5,500 and 14,000 premature deaths, 3,800 emergency room 
visits, and 4.9 million cases of acute respiratory symptoms in 2020.239 The 
agency expected that coastal areas would experience the largest improvements 
and significant improvements would extend hundreds of miles inland to reach 
nonattainment areas in states such as Nevada, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania.240 
 
 232. Gary Wollenhaupt, IMO  Ships Violating New Sulfur Cap Could Be Labeled Unseaworthy,’ 
PROF. MARINER (Feb. 28, 2018, 3:19 PM), http://www.professionalmariner.com/March-2018/IMO-
Ships-violating-new-sulfur-cap-could-be-labeled-unseaworthy/ (noting that “USCG has seen good 
compliance with the 2015 0.1 percent sulfur cap and we intend to continue using the same process (for 
enforcement)”); U.S. Pilot Suggests Good Supplier Compliance with ECA Sulphur Limit, INT’L BUNKER 
INDUS. ASS’N (July 29, 2016), https://ibia.net/us-pilot-suggests-good-supplier-compliance-with-eca-
sulphur-limit/ (noting USCG reluctance to collect and test fuel samples).  
 233. The Netherlands report shows this rate as 6.7 percent, because they exclude results between 0.10 
percent and 0.13 percent. Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport, Miniterie van Infrasturctuur en Milieu, 
Netherlands Yearly Report on Sulphur Inspections, Report on sulphur compliance data of the Netherlands 
– 2017 (2017). 
 234. Id.  
 235. See Ship & Bunker News Team, Five Shipping Companies Reported in Denmark after Bunker 
Samples Show ECA Violations, SHIP & BUNKER (June 21, 2016) https://shipandbunker.com/news/emea/
287614-five-shipping-firms-reported-in-denmark-after-bunker-samples-show-eca-violations. 
 236. SO2 is a lung irritant that can harm the human respiratory system and make breathing difficult. 
Perhaps more importantly, SO2 reacts in the atmosphere to form fine particles. Sulfur Dioxide Basics, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/so2-pollution/sulfur-dioxide-basics#effects (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). Fine 
particle pollution can cause a host of health problems, including cardiac and lung problems, and is a 
particular problem for asthmatics. Health and Environmental Effects of Particulate Matter (PM), EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/health-and-environmental-effects-particulate-matter-pm (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2020). 
 237. See Green Book PM-2.5 (2012) Area Information, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/green-book/green
-book-pm-25-2012-area-information (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 238. Designation of North American Emission Control Area to Reduce Emissions from Ships, EPA, 
OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY 5 (2010), https://nepis epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100AU0I.PDF?
Dockey=P100AU0I.PDF. 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id.  
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The California Air Resources Board has reported that air quality data indicate 
that ship emissions travel up to 102 miles inland from California’s coast.241 
Multiplying the pollution level of one ship times the number of ships worldwide 
gives an indication of the enormity of the impact of SO2 pollution from the 
industry as a whole—the fifteen largest ships in the world, when operated with 
high sulfur fuel, emit more SO2 than all cars on the planet, combined.242  
Cheating in shipping also has significant implications for the creation of a 
level playing field in the industry. In 2014, several ship owners met to discuss a 
worry that without a robust check of ships, those shipping companies in 
compliance with the standard would be at a competitive disadvantage to those in 
violation.243 The ship owners formed the Trident Alliance, which, throughout 
the 2014 to 2020 period, regularly pushed for strong enforcement and the 
importance of creating a level playing field in the industry.244 For example, in 
2016, Maersk, a Trident Alliance member, expressed strong concerns with the 
global sulfur cap, stating, “an unclear legal framework, no dissuasive sanctions, 
inadequate detection methods and limited resources have created a window for 
risk-free noncompliance with the upcoming global cap.”245 A 2019 literature 
study on the sulfur regulations also found that “a homogeneous enforcement 
regime is required to ensure a level playing field amongst ship operators.”246  
B. USCG/EPA Detection 
Implementation of MARPOL Annex VI is entirely conducted through the 
domestic agencies of member countries. In the United States, the key 
implementing statute is the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, which provides 
primary regulatory authority to USCG and secondary authority to EPA.247 In 
particular, EPA has served in a cooperative role with USCG on enforcement and 
has provided input on applications from regulated shipping entities requesting 
 
 241. CAL. AIR RES. BD., APPENDIX B: ARB’S LEGAL AUTHORITY B-3, https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/regact
/2008/fuelogv08/appbfuel.pdf. 
 242. The largest fifteen ships on the planet running on high-sulfur fuel emit more sulfur oxides than 
all cars on the planet combined. Shipping Facts, INT’L CHAMBER OF SHIPPING, https://www.ics-
shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-facts (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 243. Ship & Bunker News Team, New Shipping Initiative to Work for Strong ECA Enforcement, SHIP 
& BUNKER (May 15, 2014), https://shipandbunker.com/news/world/693043-new-shipping-initiative-to-
work-for-strong-eca-enforcement.  
 244. Id.; see also NED MOLLOY, THE IMO’S 2020 GLOBAL SULFUR CAP: WHAT A 2020 SULFUR-
CONSTRAINED WORLD MEANS FOR SHIPPING LINES, REFINERIES AND BUNKER SUPPLIERS 9 (Richard 
Rubin ed., 2016), available at https://www.isemar.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/SR-IMO-2020-Global-
sulfur-cap-102016.pdf; Ship & Bunker News Team, Sulfur Regs Group Trident Alliance Wound Up at 
End of 2020, SHIP & BUNKER (Jan. 12, 2021), https://shipandbunker.com/news/world/748773-sulfur-regs-
group-trident-alliance-wound-up-at-end-of-2020. 
 245. MOLLOY, supra note 244, at 9. 
 246. See Thalis P.V. Zis & Kevin Cullinane, The Desulphurisation of Shipping  Past, Present and 
the Future under a Global Cap, 82 TRANSP. RSCH. 102316, 102316 (May 2020). 
 247. Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1912 (2019). 
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alternative compliance mechanisms.248 Furthermore, some states, including 
California, have further restrictions on air pollution from ships.249  
Detection of SO2 violations occurs at the port of call for ships entering into 
a specific country. Inspections of foreign-registered ships are usually conducted 
by the maritime agency of the country that the ship has entered, such as USCG. 
This inspection regime is known as Port State Control (PSC).250 The overall goal 
of PSC is “to verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment complies 
with the requirements of international conventions,” such as MARPOL.251 Thus, 
PSC concurrently checks for compliance with multiple environmental laws and 
regulations involving air pollution, water pollution, and oily discharge. Further, 
PSC is in charge of checking for compliance with numerous safety regulations.  
PSC inspections for SO2 standards in the United States are largely a paper 
check. That is, the USCG job aid protocol for inspectors only requires that PSC 
inspectors check to see if fuel purchase documents reflect that the ship purchased 
compliant fuel.252 Inspectors do not verify that the ship actually burned such 
fuel.253 Nor do inspectors verify when the ship began burning such fuel. Thus, 
in theory, the ship could have purchased compliant fuel but also purchased 
noncompliant fuel and burned that instead. Or, the ship could have purchased 
compliant fuel but only burned it a few miles away from coming into port, in 
case it was at risk of inspection, but not at the 200 nautical miles entry point to 
the North American ECA, for example. Only with some kind of verification, like 
 
 248. EPA and USCG have established a memorandum of understanding (MOU) governing their 
enforcement relationship. The latest iteration of that MOU can be found at Revised Protocol on Referrals 
under MARPOL Annex VI, as Implemented by APPS, EPA & U.S. COAST GUARD (June 20, 2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-07/documents/annexvifonarrevreferralprotocolfinaljoint
executed.pdf. In addition, to see an example of the kind of “alternative compliance method” granted to 
one regulated shipping company, see TOTE Granted ECA Exemption during LNG Conversion, SHIP & 
BUNKER (Aug. 8, 2012), https://shipandbunker.com/news/am/385950-tote-granted-eca-exemption-
during-lng-conversion. 
 249. Federal authorization under the CAA is required for regulating new marine engines and for 
requiring retrofits on existing engines. However, no CAA authorization is required for implementing in-
use operational requirements on existing marine ship engines. Further, federal cases have supported a 
state’s authority to protect the state’s air quality by imposing operational requirements on ship operators 
carrying out activities in the state and U.S. territorial waters, as well as on the high seas, in certain 
circumstances. See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d. 483 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding 
Alaska’s regulatory scheme, which imposed requirements on ships for the purpose of water pollution 
control).  
 250. PSC is an inspection system for countries to inspect foreign ships in ports other than those of 
the flag state, where the ship is registered. IMO originally intended PSC inspections to be a backup to 
inspections that were supposed to happen by the country where a ship is registered or licensed—the flag 
state. However, PSC inspection has become the primary means for implementation because flag state 
inspection has been woefully inadequate. Port State Control, INT’L MARINE ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/PortStateControl.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2020); see 
also Antoine Halff, Slow Steaming to 2020  Innovation and Inertia in Marine Transport and Fuels, 
COLUM. SCH. INT’L & PUB. AFFS. 22 (Aug. 2017). 
 251. Port State Control, LLOYD’S REG., www.lr.org/en/port-state-control (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 252. U.S. COAST GUARD, OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE, ECA JOB AID 1 (2012), 
https://homeport.uscg.mil/Lists/Content/Attachments/891/ECA_Job_Aid_3.pdf.  
 253. Id. 
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actually sampling and testing the fuel during an inspection, would inspectors be 
able to truly assess whether the ship burned compliant fuel, as opposed to simply 
purchasing it. Indeed, USCG 2017 and 2018 PSC inspection reports do not list 
any detected violations of SO2 fuel standards.254 It is unclear whether this is 
because all regulated ships were compliant in these years or whether the 
inspection protocol is simply too weak to detect cheating.  
International law does impose restrictions on PSC’s ability to conduct any 
more extensive inspections of ships, including anything involving testing of fuel. 
The Law of the Sea Convention, widely recognized as the general legal 
framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out, 
provides that any physical inspection of a foreign ship shall be limited to an 
examination of certificates, records, and documents.255 However, and most 
importantly, the Convention instructs that physical inspection of the ship may be 
undertaken when there are clear grounds to do so.256 Guidance documents 
provide that clear grounds exist when a PSC inspector finds evidence warranting 
such an inspection.257 Such evidence could include missing or invalid 
documentation, evidence that the master or crew are not familiar with shipboard 
operations, or evidence that the quality of fuel oil appears to be substandard.258 
USCG relies on such case-by-case information, including informant tips, to 
establish clear grounds for physical inspection.259 Several of USCG’s most well-
known cases, including violations of oil-discharge regulations from “magic 
pipes,” began with tips from whistleblowers.260  
In practice, port authorities around the world interpret the clear grounds 
standard differently. Interestingly, the European Union member countries, 
Canada, and Hong Kong routinely inspect and sample fuel for verification, even 
when there is no obvious clear grounds indication of a violation by a particular 
ship. The European Union, in particular, requires member states to test the sulfur 
 
 254. See generally U.S. COAST GUARD, PORT STATE CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES (2018), 
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/CG-CVC/CVC2/psc/AnnualReports
/annualrpt18.pdf. 
 255. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 226, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 256. Similarly, MARPOL states that any inspection shall be limited to verifying that there is on board 
a valid certificate, unless there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or its 
equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of that certificate. See International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, art. 5, Feb. 17, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61. The 
International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea also states that certificates, if valid, shall be accepted 
unless there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or of its equipment does not 
correspond substantially with the particulars of any of the certificates. See International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea, ch. V, Reg. 19, 1184 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force May 25, 1980. 
 257. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 220, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 255; IMO, 
30th Sess., Res. 1119, at 10 (Dec. 6, 2017). 
 258. See Mission Management System Work Instruction, U.S. COAST GUARD OFFICE OF COM. 
VESSEL COMPLIANCE (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-
5PC/CG-CVC/CVC_MMS/CVC-WI-022_signed.pdf. 
 259. Enforcing Maritime Laws  Roles of Private Citizens, ENV’T L. INST. (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.eli.org/events/enforcing-maritime-laws-role-private-citizens. 
 260. See “Magic Pipe” MARPOL Violations Can Be Spotted from Space, supra note 113. 
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content of fuel for a specified percentage of inspected ships, depending on 
whether or not the member state borders a sulfur emission control area.261 
Similarly, Transport Canada, the enforcement agency for Canada’s ECA, 
routinely obtains and tests fuel during its port state exams.262 In Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen, hundreds of ships are currently randomly selected for spot checks.263 
On occasion, USCG PSC has conducted voluntary sampling programs. In 2016, 
for example, USCG conducted a two-week sampling program at the Port of 
Baltimore and the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach as a pilot test. In a public 
blog post, written after the sampling, Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas of USCG 
said that the voluntary fuel sampling and testing pilot was “initiated in response 
to industry concern” about lack of accountability and enforcement.264 The 
inspectors asked ship masters for permission to sample and informed ships that 
they would not receive sanctions if the voluntary samples were noncompliant.265 
Inspectors in the program asked forty-seven ships to participate.266 Ten of the 
forty-seven ships declined.267 USCG took two samples each from thirty-seven 
ships, for a total of seventy-four samples.268 EPA inspectors joined USCG 
inspectors in the sampling program and used portable fuel samplers to test fuel 
on site. The results of USCG PSC’s voluntary sampling demonstrate the 
existence of cheating and the need for involuntary sampling. Six of the thirty-
seven ships had noncompliant fuel. Also telling is that all the bunker delivery 
notes, including the six noncompliant ships, stated that the fuel was compliant, 
at 0.10 percent sulfur or less.269 Further, ten of forty-seven, or over 20 percent 
of the ships, did not provide consent for USCG to sample at all.270 USCG has 
not conducted another pilot since 2016.271  
Without inspection and sampling of fuel, detection and deterrence of SO2 
violations remains severely limited. Ship operators are unlikely to have record 
books or bunker delivery notes documenting that fuel used on board is 
noncompliant.272 Bunker delivery notes are known to contain irregularities and 
 
 261. 2015 O.J. (L 41) 253, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32015D0253. 
 262. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 226, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 255 
 263. See Ernest Kao, Hong Kong Authorities Set to Ramp Up Fight against Air Pollution from Ships 
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https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/health-environment/article/2184344/hong-kong-authorities-set-
ramp-fight-against-air. 
 264. See U.S. Pilot Suggests Good Supplier Compliance with ECA Sulphur Limit, supra note 232. 
 265. Voluntary Vessel Fuel Oil Sampling Program, U.S. COAST GUARD (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.
dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/MSIB/2016/003_16_2-17-2016.pdf. 
 266. Id.  
 267. Id.  
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 270. See id.  
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 272. See Halff, supra note 250.  
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fraud.273 Individual ship operators may have also falsified other onboard records, 
such as the fuel change over logs, to attempt to conceal cheating.274 Without a 
specific tip, however, the USCG PSC process can do no more than simply board 
a ship, on occasion, and check the bunker delivery note to see if it appears the 
ship received compliant fuel and review documents to determine if the records 
show the ship changed fuel at the appropriate location.275 Such a restriction on 
investigation, without other methods of obtaining information, is a significant 
barrier to effective enforcement. 
C. Self-Monitor and Report 
Regulated shipping entities have advocated for regulatory changes that help 
agencies better detect corporate cheating of the SO2 standards.276 Perhaps in 
response, the IMO passed a fuel carriage ban, which became effective on March 
1, 2020.277 Under the ban, ships are no longer allowed to carry noncompliant 
fuel on board for use in operating the ship.278 Thus, the theory is, if a ship is 
subject to USCG inspection at port, the inspector can simply look to see if 
noncompliant fuel is on board, and then sampling is not required. The carriage 
ban has been lauded as a success story in helping make agency detection of 
cheating much easier. Indeed, the point of the ban was to make detection 
easier,279 and the ban’s enactment demonstrates how effective the voices of 
regulated shipping entities can be.  
However, the carriage ban is not enough to support consistent detection of 
corporate cheating. In part, the carriage ban does not apply to ships with 
scrubbers, and as a result, some argue that a ship could invest in a scrubber to 
avoid paying the high costs of compliant fuel but not actually operate the 
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scrubber, causing significant emissions in excess of the SO2 standards.280 
Moreover, because port state control inspectors cannot check every ship that 
comes into port, regulated shipping entities may decide to take the risk and carry 
and burn noncompliant fuel. The high economic incentive is tempting, 
particularly given that regulated shipping entities may be able to guess when they 
will be subject to inspections, which typically occur on a relatively scheduled 
basis.281 Regulated entities and corresponding trade associations continue to 
push for increased agency surveillance and enforcement. 
This Article therefore recommends that regulated shipping entities continue 
to advocate for more robust self-monitoring and reporting. Regulated shipping 
entities should specifically advocate for requirements that all ships monitor SO2 
using CEMS and report those data via AIS.282 CEMS requirements for all ships 
would likely require new IMO guidance and perhaps changes to MARPOL 
itself.283 While many regulated shipping companies and trade associations are 
resistant to the idea of required CEMS,284 there is no question that use of CEMS 
would make a dramatic difference in agency ability to detect cheating.285  
CEMS provide needed ongoing information to agencies to detect not just 
cheating, but minor or inadvertent violations as well. The fear of agencies’ 
indiscriminate use of CEMS data, resulting in lumping together significant 
emissions violations with more minor violations, existed amongst regulated 
entities during EPA’s 1997 proposal of the compliance assurance monitoring 
rule.286 During development of the rule, industry groups commented “because 
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increased data is [sic] supplied to the government under . . . CEMS requirements, 
industry believes that EPA, states and citizen groups will bring enforcement 
actions for minor violations.”287 Industry also commented that monitoring that 
reflects slight deviations from emissions standards due to operational variations 
or other unavoidable causes could be used against the source to prove minor 
short-term CAA violations.288 Indeed, pervasive use of CEMS will surface 
deviations and violations that could not be detected with cruder methods. 
However, most enforcement authorities give considerable latitude to industrial 
sources that discover and rapidly correct such deviations and violations, as long 
as they disclose them and put in place procedures to prevent recurrence.289  
Moreover, CEMS on ships are now technically feasible and inexpensive.290 
For a long time, there have been concerns that because CEMS are placed in or 
near the exhaust of ships, they are subject to extremes of temperature, acidity, 
vibration, erosion, and the corrosive effects of salt air, which could impact their 
reliability.291 However, ships operating with scrubbers have been using CEMS 
since approximately 2012 and have been able to accurately analyze exhaust gases 
from the combustion of fuel in real time, automatically record all information, 
and display the information on a computer screen in the ship’s engine room.292 
Each new generation of CEMS is more reliable and accurate, and the cycle of 
improvement is much faster than regulations are typically able to keep up 
with.293 There have already been several improvements since the first CEMS on 
vessels went into operation.294 Thus, regulated shipping entities that have 
experience with scrubbers and CEMS can and should propose technical guidance 
on the operation of scrubbers to the IMO. Such technical guidance could be 
modeled in part on the experience of operationalizing CEMS on ships, but it 
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could also incorporate lessons learned from the use of CEMS on land-based 
pollution sources.295 For example, EPA has long had missing-data regulations 
for land-based sources with CEMS, which provide operators with specific 
sampling procedures to use that will conservatively estimate emissions data 
during the time that a CEMS is down.296 Further, the cost to install and use a 
CEMS is relatively minor and not a major argument against CEMS 
requirements.297 Indeed, one company has quoted the price for a CEMS to be 
just €43,000.298 
In addition, CEMS can identify mechanical problems for ship operators. 
Environmental engineers who have experience operating CEMS with land-based 
sources have discovered that CEMS are helpful to discover violations caused by 
mechanical issues and enable regulated entities to take corrective action. In one 
case involving a facility, an engineer discovered that a large piece of machinery 
and its control equipment suddenly stopped functioning properly, causing the 
facility to fall out of compliance with its permit.299 The CEMS allowed the 
manager to proactively move to minimize the impact of the malfunction.300 In 
addition, the CEMS provided concrete records of exactly how long the 
malfunction lasted, allowing the manager to accurately explain the 
noncompliance to EPA.301 Ultimately, the manager estimated that without the 
CEMS, the noncompliance period would have tripled.302 
Finally, current agency efforts to monitor ship SO2 emissions remotely, 
while useful, are not enough to detect cheating in open waters. To be sure, several 
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European Union countries have had very successful detection results from 
remote monitors on bridges that ships pass under when coming into specific 
ports. In one example, the Danish maritime agency was able to discover a 
potential violation after a remote monitor, located on the Great Belt Bridge, 
under which ships pass as they travel between Norway and Germany, detected 
higher than permitted readings.303 The Danish maritime agency alerted the 
Norwegian maritime agency, which made a spot check inspection upon the ship’s 
arrival in Oslo.304 Ultimately, the Norwegian maritime agency issued the largest 
SO2 ECA penalty to date to that ship, which came into the port of Oslo, Norway, 
from Kiel, Germany.305 While information from the remote monitor at the Great 
Belt Bridge has not yet been used as evidence in a court proceeding, the 
information gained from remote monitors supports the targeting of ships that 
should be slated for port inspection.306 In other words, if the Great Belt Bridge 
monitor reports that a ship has high emissions, the authorities at the location 
where the ship next docks should inspect it and sample and analyze the fuels it 
has used. However, remote monitors on bridges, while useful for detection within 
emission control areas, are not useful to detecting cheating of IMO 2020 open 
water standards. There are simply no bridges in the middle of the ocean. Further, 
results from information gained at the Great Belt Bridge fixed monitor show a 
generally higher SO2 content far from shore than right under the monitor, 
implying that some ships change to compliant fuel just before passing under the 
bridge rather than at the required 200 nautical mile mark.307 
Recognizing the limited capabilities of remote monitors on bridges, several 
European Union countries and Hong Kong are in the process of experimenting 
with remote monitors on drones and satellites. In particular, both Norway’s 
maritime authority and the Danish environmental agency have started 
experimental trials with drones.308 Government agencies in Hong Kong also are 
conducting trials using drones.309 The Finnish Meteorological Institute has tried 
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monitoring emissions via satellite, and while it was possible to measure the 
average SO2 content in the air over a large area, the satellites could not readily 
identify the level of SO2 emissions from a specific source.310 It remains to be 
seen what all the technical factors will be for large drone and satellite projects. 
USCG should also consider investing in such pilot projects, just as EPA is doing 
for land-based sources like oil and gas fracking sites.311 Regardless, the cost for 
agencies to engage in such projects will undoubtedly prevent massive use of 
remote monitoring as the primary method for detecting cheating.312 As a result, 
remote monitoring should serve as a backup check to detect potential tampering 
or failures associated with mandatory CEMS.313 In addition, remote monitoring 
should continue until the more permanent solution of mandatory CEMS comes 
to being.  
The AIS can provide the needed electronic platform to receive CEMS 
data.314 The AIS is an automated, autonomous tracking system used for the 
exchange of navigational information between ships and AIS-receiving stations, 
such as AIS-equipped terminals, including port state controls or environmental 
agency authorities.315 The IMO requires large ships that travel internationally to 
carry an AIS transponder.316 In layman’s terms, vessels send out a signal every 
couple of seconds that includes static elements such as vessel identifiers and 
dynamic elements such as location (latitude/longitude), vessel speed, and 
destination, which is typically provided by the vessels’ global positioning 
systems. These signals are received by other vessels, offshore platforms, 
terrestrial bases, and satellites for operations in international waters. There is no 
reason that there could not be a dedicated channel for broadcast of CEMS data 
through the existing AIS. Interestingly, the AIS can also receive information 
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directly from satellites.317 Such a centralized reporting system has the key 
benefit of allowing multiple agencies to access ongoing information about 
regulated entity behavior at one time.318  
Public accessibility of CEMS monitoring and reporting data will 
undoubtedly be a concern for regulated shipping entities. The AIS was originally 
developed by IMO as a standard which would help ships to avoid collisions and 
assist port authorities in controlling marine traffic.319 However, it became clear 
that the AIS could be used in a variety of business- and research-related areas as 
well. Now, the AIS is used by a variety of people, industries, and agencies. All 
that is needed is an AIS access account. An AIS account can cost between $75 
and over $9,000 per month, depending on the number of vessels being tracked, 
whether satellite tracking is needed, the response rate of the transmissions, the 
inclusion of historical data, and customized data configurations.320 Thus, if 
agencies were to publicize CEMS data through the AIS, the information would 
be publicly available. Such transparency may be just what regulated shipping 
entities need to ensure that any cheating on IMO 2020 standards will not go 
unnoticed.  
Indeed, the concept of continuous monitoring should not be unfamiliar to 
regulated shipping entities or IMO. MARPOL Annex I, which controls oil 
pollution discharges from ships, already includes continuous monitoring 
requirements.321 The costs and technical arguments against mandatory CEMS 
are so minor that they are outweighed by the relative benefits to industry as a 
whole from an increase in the likelihood of detecting cheating. That is, CEMS 
helps the shipping industry ensure that cheaters will be caught, thereby making 
it worth the cost for individual shipping companies to spend money on compliant 
fuel in the first place. Further, CEMS helps the shipping industry know when 
individual shipping companies are in violation, thereby helping in making 
business decisions to avoid entering into contracting relationships with such 
noncompliant companies.  
Lastly, governments, recognizing the practical and financial limits of 
remote monitoring, should see the benefit of CEMS and the AIS and also push 
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for their adoption by IMO as a required monitoring and reporting method. The 
authors note that it still takes significant work for government agencies to sort 
through CEMS data.322 However, the advantage in targeting inspections and 
sampling should more than make up for the investment in data targeting software. 
In addition, electronic monitoring and reporting should save agencies money and 
improve inspection and enforcement targeting to the ships most likely to be (or 
to have been) in violation. Systems will need to be developed to scan the 
incoming data and provide assessments to port state and flag state323 authorities. 
Ideally, the IMO would provide this service; if it does not, that responsibility 
would fall either to the individual port and flag states or to the regional groupings 
of port states, such as the Paris MOU or the Tokyo MOU.324 
We should not risk a high level of global noncompliance before the shipping 
community at large embraces the merits of mandatory installation of CEMS.325 
As early as 2014, the Clean Shipping Coalition called for the installation of 
CEMS on all ships and for the use of such CEMS during the entire journey of 
the ship.326 Maersk, a shipping entity, has stated, “We need a black box on every 
ship to measure what it is emitting.”327 It is time for everyone to get on board.  
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article is to focus on mandated self-monitoring and 
reporting as a way to help agencies detect corporate noncompliance, and 
particularly corporate cheating, with regulations that we all benefit from. While 
the case study at issue here is on the shipping industry and detection of cheating 
with new international SO2 pollution standards, the overall point of this Article 
has application in other areas of environmental regulation. Two potential areas 
where technology can help in mandatory self-monitoring and reporting are 
detection of defeat devices in vehicles and detection of methane leaks at oil and 
gas sites. 
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State agencies, in particular, are exploring various technologies to help in 
detection of defeat devices. California Air Resources Board, the agency 
responsible at the California state level for enforcement of air pollution 
standards, has also been looking at technology, including the Real Emissions 
Assessment Logging (REAL) program, to detect NOx defeat device violations, 
similar to what occurred in the Volkswagen scandal.328 REAL would require 
internal onboard diagnostic systems in vehicles to collect and store NOx 
emissions data on medium- and heavy-duty diesel vehicles, starting in the 2022 
model year.329 The REAL data would be retrieved from the vehicle by plugging 
a scan tool or data reader into the vehicle. As a result, REAL would operate 
similarly to a mandatory self-monitor and report system. As noted by one 
California Air Resources Board official, “REAL will provide the ability to 
monitor all vehicles for emissions performance, and allow us to spot trouble 
faster. Had this program been available sooner, we would likely have recognized 
widespread, serious problems with manufacturers such as Volkswagen . . . much 
earlier.”330  
Further, there is significant potential for use of sensors to detect 
noncompliance and cheating with methane standards at oil and gas facilities. For 
example, a collaboration between industry, environmental groups, and 
universities, called Project Astra, is working on a sensor network for the oil and 
gas producing regions of the United States.331 The stated goal of the project is to 
provide near-continuous monitoring, allowing producers and regulators to find 
and fix significant methane releases which are currently only measured on an 
annual or semi-annual basis.332 Of note, EPA has found significant widespread 
noncompliance with Leak Detection and Repair regulations. 333 Sensors like 
those described in Project Astra have the potential to curb widespread 
noncompliance.   
Detection is key in multiple areas of environmental enforcement. Agencies 
must have information that is reliable and continuous in order to keep up. It is in 
the interest of industry, too, to ensure that agencies are able to effectively enforce 
regulations, particularly where cheaters that go undetected are able to gain an 
advantage in the marketplace. Mandatory self-monitoring and reporting, 
especially with the help of technology, can help both agencies and industry 
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achieve such intended goals. Technology provides a way for enforcement 
agencies to get ahead of violations before they occur. There is no need to wait 
for the next corporate cheating scandal.  
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